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Resumen 
Desde la disolución de Yugoslavia en los años ‘90, sus antiguas repúblicas 
(Bosnia y Herzegovina, Croacia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia y Eslovenia) han 
tomado diferentes senderos. Sin embargo, un denominador común para todas ellas 
es el camino hacia la Unión Europea (UE). Todos los países han tenido que pasar 
por un proceso de transición de una economía socialista, con planificación 
centralizada, a una economía de libre mercado. Esto también incluye garantizar la 
estabilidad fiscal mediante la implementación de nuevas políticas económicas y 
reformas institucionales. Revisando a la literatura científica sobre cuestiones fiscales 
en los países de la antigua Yugoslavia se encuentran principalmente trabajos 
centrados en la crisis económica y otros temas específicos. Además, se trata de 
estudios que se centran únicamente en un país o con amplias muestras de países que, 
en el mejor de los casos, incluyen algunas de las seis repúblicas. 
En contraste con estos estudios, esta tesis adopta una perspectiva cross-country 
y se ocupa exclusivamente de los seis países ex-yugoslavos. Adoptar este punto de 
vista implica la posibilidad de comparar evoluciones desde un punto de partida 
común. De esta forma, consideramos la secesión como un tipo de experimento 
natural. Para alcanzar sus objetivos, este documento está organizado de la siguiente 
manera. En el capítulo 1, se analiza la relación entre el ciclo económico y las 
variables fiscales, incluyendo el déficit, el gasto y los impuestos. El capítulo 2 se 
dedica a estimar la evasión fiscal con respecto a la economía total y algunos 
impuestos individuales. Finalmente, el capítulo 3 se centra en examinar los 
determinantes de la moral tributaria en los países de la antigua Yugoslavia, 
analizando el efecto de las variables contextuales que cambian a través de los países 
y durante el período de transición. Los contenidos de los capítulos han sido 
presentados en congresos y publicados como documentos de trabajo. 
Capítulo 1 
En el capítulo 1 se realiza un análisis econométrico de los principales 
agregados fiscales; déficit, gastos totales e ingresos totales. Para ello, se ha 
compilado una nueva base de datos integrada. 
La investigación se centra en dos objetivos. En primer lugar, analizar la 
evolución de los agregados fiscales claves y evaluar la dinámica de la composición 
de los ingresos fiscales. Desafortunadamente, la falta de datos sobre la composición 
de los gastos hace que un análisis de ambos lados del presupuesto sea imposible. En 
segundo lugar, se calcula la elasticidad del déficit, los impuestos y los gastos con 
respecto al Producto Interior Bruto (PIB). Este aspecto es relevante desde el punto 
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de vista de la política fiscal en la medida en que la estabilidad fiscal no depende 
solamente del déficit estructural, sino también del efecto del ciclo económico en los 
ingresos y gastos. Un output gap positivo implica una recaudación adicional de 
impuestos y una reducción en algunos programas de gastos (por ejemplo, seguro de 
desempleo, debido a un recorte en la tasa de desempleo). Y viceversa. 
La recopilación de datos homogéneos para las antiguas repúblicas yugoslavas 
ha sido una tarea ardua. Esto probablemente explica por qué los estudios 
comparativos entre países han sido tan escasos hasta ahora. Como no existe una 
fuente uniforme para todos ellos, los datos debían recopilarse individualmente. 
Teniendo en cuenta las diferentes estructuras de gobierno, fue necesario ponerse en 
contacto con diversas instituciones, como oficinas nacionales de estadísticas, bancos 
centrales y ministerios de finanzas. Además, para confirmar su falta de datos, 
también fue necesario investigar la disponibilidad de datos en las instituciones 
europeas. Según la disponibilidad, en cinco países, los respectivos Ministerios de 
Finanzas se han tomado como una fuente relevante para todas las variables fiscales 
presentes en la base de datos. La excepción fue Bosnia y Herzegovina, donde el 
Banco Central tiene la tarea de recopilar y presentar datos consolidados para todo el 
país. Aunque en algunos países los datos suelen estar disponibles públicamente en 
sus páginas web, otros son guardados para su uso interno. Esto significó establecer 
un contacto necesario y buscar datos a través de canales formales. Después de 
compilar toda la información necesaria, los datos sin procesar debían recalcularse en 
una unidad de medida conjunta, que en nuestro caso ha sido el porcentaje del PIB. 
La muestra cubre el período 2001-2014, pero el punto de partida no es el mismo en 
todos los casos debido a la falta de disponibilidad de datos anteriores. 
Con el fin de analizar la composición de los ingresos fiscales y su evolución a 
lo largo del tiempo, agrupamos los países de interés con un amplio conjunto de países 
europeos; si los patrones comunes son lo suficientemente fuertes, se debería detectar 
la existencia de un clúster dentro de la agrupación. En particular, el análisis incluye 
datos de las categorías de impuestos en 34 países. Sobre la base de los datos 
disponibles, utilizamos valores promedio para los dos períodos de siete años, de 
2001–2007 y 2008–2014. El análisis utiliza el método de agrupamiento de enlaces 
promedio y la distancia euclidiana como medidas de similitud o disimilitud. 
Realizamos un análisis de clúster para cada período. En ambas etapas, cuatro de las 
cinco antiguas repúblicas yugoslavas pertenecen al mismo grupo, lo que confirma la 
existencia de patrones comunes. 
Respecto al análisis de elasticidad, la primera variable dependiente es el déficit 
y los regresores son el output gap y el déficit endógeno rezagado. En otras 
estimaciones, los gastos o los ingresos reemplazan el déficit. En la mayoría de los 
casos, los resultados principales se mantienen utilizando estimadores Panel OLS 
(PLS) o GMM. 
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El resultado principal es que el déficit está influenciado estadística y 
significativamente por el output gap. Los coeficientes en esta variable están entre 
1.02 y 1.70. Si bien la relación entre los ingresos totales y el PIB no aparece 
influenciada por el ciclo, la de los gastos sobre el PIB sí lo está, con una elasticidad 
promedio de alrededor de -1.25. Por lo tanto, la elasticidad del déficit con respecto a 
la brecha del producto está explicada completamente por los gastos. El déficit 
público y los gastos son contracíclicos, mientras que los ingresos fiscales sobre el 
PIB siguen siendo acíclicos.  
Para aclarar este resultado se requieren investigaciones adicionales; en 
particular, para arrojar luz sobre la relevancia de los estabilizadores automáticos, las 
medidas de gasto discrecionales y la rigidez de los programas de gasto. Con respecto 
a la inelasticidad tributaria, se debe explorar el alcance y el impacto de la economía 
sumergida y la evasión fiscal en la región, y si están relacionados con el ciclo 
económico. 
Capítulo 2 
A pesar de la relevancia política y social del fraude fiscal, la literatura al 
respecto centrada en los países de la antigua Yugoslavia es escasa y, en su mayoría, 
informa sobre evidencia casual de estimaciones para países individuales. El capítulo 
2 trata de llenar este vacío en cierta medida. Debido a la gran escasez de datos que 
afectan a los países analizados, nuestro enfoque metodológico se basa 
principalmente en las estimaciones disponibles de la "economía sumergida". La falta 
de datos estadísticos específicos del país limita la utilización de otras metodologías 
para calcular la evasión fiscal. Los datos de economía sumergida utilizados en la 
estimación se tomaron de Mai y Schneider (2016).  
El segundo componente en el cálculo de la evasión fiscal es la carga fiscal. Es 
un parámetro basado en la recaudación fiscal observada (ingresos fiscales que 
incluyen contribuciones a la seguridad social) como porcentaje del PIB. Los datos 
para calcular la carga fiscal se obtuvieron del portal de datos de estadísticas de 
finanzas públicas del FMI, de los ministerios de finanzas correspondientes, así como 
de los indicadores de desarrollo mundial (valor del PIB). Finalmente, las 
estimaciones se obtuvieron de acuerdo con la metodología propuesta por Schneider 
(2015). En la tabla 1, los resultados muestran que la evasión fiscal es más alta en 
Bosnia y Herzegovina, mientras que Macedonia tiene los porcentajes más bajos de 
evasión fiscal. 
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Tabla 1: Estimación de la evasión fiscal total basada en la economía sumergida (% 
del PIB) 
 
Bosnia y 
Herzegovina Croacia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Eslovenia 
2001      5.80% 
2002  5.86%    6.24% 
2003  4.85%    6.34% 
2004  5.35%    6.13% 
2005 8.33% 5.31% 5.27%  8.42% 6.18% 
2006 8.06% 5.00% 4.78% 8.09% 7.48% 5.89% 
2007 8.01% 5.27% 5.02% 7.08% 6.66% 5.62% 
2008 7.28% 5.44% 5.37% 7.69% 6.80% 5.81% 
2009 7.89% 6.17% 5.23% 6.71% 6.97% 6.20% 
2010 8.35% 6.16% 4.68% 6.52% 8.16% 6.52% 
2011 9.14% 6.25% 5.03% 6.61% 7.32% 6.54% 
2012 8.92% 6.56% 4.66% 6.30% 7.05% 6.74% 
2013 8.25% 6.46% 4.35% 6.01% 5.94% 6.61% 
promedio 8.25% 5.72% 4.93% 6.88% 7.20% 6.20% 
Fuente: Elaboración del autor. 
Además de proporcionar estimaciones de la evasión fiscal basadas en datos de 
la economía sumergida, se explora otra opción, aunque limitada por la escasez de 
datos disponibles. Esta es la estimación de la evasión fiscal de algunos impuestos en 
Croacia y Eslovenia. A diferencia de la estimación anterior, esta se basa en la brecha 
detectada entre las cuentas nacionales y los datos fiscales. 
Las estimaciones de evasión fiscal realizadas en este capítulo son las primeras 
para algunos países. Por ejemplo, para Montenegro y Serbia. En segundo lugar, 
hacemos estimaciones sobre períodos de ocho años y más. Al utilizar nuestro 
conjunto de datos homogéneos, realizamos las estimaciones de evasión fiscal más 
tempranas para 2001 y las más recientes para 2013. En contraste, la literatura 
disponible hace solo estimaciones de un año. Con respecto a las implicaciones de 
nuestros resultados, consideramos el fenómeno de la evasión fiscal en el contexto de 
tres paradigmas para controlar la evasión fiscal, es decir, la aplicación de políticas, 
el servicio y la confianza. Finalmente, analizamos la recaudación de impuestos en 
todos los países para mostrar que, en relación con sus economías completas, la 
recaudación de impuestos se realiza a un alto nivel. 
Capítulo 3 
El objetivo del capítulo 3 es analizar el efecto de los nuevos marcos tributarios 
en la moral tributaria, definida como “la motivación intrínseca para pagar impuestos 
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que surge de la obligación moral de pagar impuestos como contribución a la 
sociedad" (Cummings et al., 2005). En particular, se examinan los determinantes de 
la moral tributaria en los países de la antigua Yugoslavia, y se evalúa el efecto de las 
variables contextuales que cambian a través de los países y durante el período de 
transición. Esas variables contextuales incluyen tanto el nivel como la dinámica de 
la carga tributaria, el alcance de las actividades ocultas y la evasión fiscal percibida, 
y un índice de libertad económica. La fuente de las variables de nivel individual y la 
moral fiscal es el Estudio de Valores Europeos de 2008. 
Al observar las variables de nivel individual, la mayoría de las que se usan 
comúnmente en la literatura dan como resultado signos esperados y son 
estadísticamente significativas. Con respecto a las variables de estatus personal, la 
moral tributaria se relaciona positivamente con la edad, el género, la educación y la 
religión, mientras que se relaciona negativamente con los ingresos. Se enfatiza el 
impacto positivo de la educación en la moral tributaria, donde las personas con 
educación superior deberían tener una moral tributaria más alta. Además, las 
variables de estado civil y empleo demuestran no tener influencia sobre la moral 
tributaria, con la única excepción de las personas empleadas a tiempo parcial. En 
cuanto a las variables de creencias personales, la confianza en instituciones como el 
gobierno, el parlamento, la justicia y los partidos políticos no tiene ningún efecto en 
la moral tributaria. No obstante, el orgullo nacional y la no justificación del soborno 
parecen correlacionarse positivamente con la moral tributaria. 
Las variables contextuales se utilizan para explorar el vínculo entre la carga 
fiscal del país, la economía sumergida y la libertad económica con la moral tributaria. 
Primero, el coeficiente sobre la carga impositiva general y el cambio en la carga 
impositiva general es significativo y negativo. De todos modos, el coeficiente sobre 
la carga impositiva directa es igualmente significativo y negativo, mientras que el 
resto de los impuestos (los indirectos) no juegan ningún papel. En segundo lugar, la 
aparición de la economía sumergida, al igual que la carga fiscal, también tiene un 
impacto negativo estadísticamente significativo en la moral fiscal. Por último, el 
índice de libertad económica también desempeña un papel relacionado con la moral 
tributaria: al tener más libertad económica en un país, es probable que aumente la 
moral tributaria de los individuos. Además, todos estos efectos mantienen su aspecto 
cuando se combinan en una estimación final. 
Por último, se exploran las interacciones entre algunas de las variables 
contextuales utilizadas anteriormente y las variables individuales. Estas variables 
contextuales dentro de las interacciones representan un efecto moderador del 
coeficiente en la variable individual correspondiente. En primer lugar, cuando la 
carga fiscal interactúa con el orgullo nacional, se descubre que el efecto del 
patriotismo se desvanece cuando aumenta la carga fiscal. En segundo lugar, se 
encuentra el mismo efecto para el soborno y la economía sumergida. Esta última 
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tiende a reducir el efecto positivo de la variable soborno y la moral tributaria. Una 
mayor economía sumergida socava también la moral fiscal de los individuos más 
intolerantes a la corrupción. Finalmente, se encuentra que, cuanto mayor es la 
libertad económica en un país, el efecto negativo de los ingresos individuales sobre 
la moral tributaria tiende a disminuir. En la estimación conjunta, se confirman todos 
los resultados mencionados anteriormente. 
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Abstract 
This PhD thesis is made of 3 chapters, whose contents were presented at 
conferences and published as working papers. The first chapter has the aim to analyse 
fiscal policy in former Yugoslavian countries over the period 2001–2014. The 
contribution of the chapter is threefold; first, a homogeneous database is built to 
describe the evolution of the main fiscal aggregates in each country using an identical 
analytical structure. Second, the composition of national tax revenues is analysed to 
determine whether common patterns are still present, or if they have evolved in 
different ways over time. Third, data is pooled to analyse and compute the elasticity 
of budget imbalance, taxes and expenditure to the output gap. The results show that 
tax revenue composition is still similar and that the output gap is highly significant 
in explaining the evolution of both deficit and expenditures over GDP in all 
countries, but not to account for the evolution of revenues over GDP. 
The second chapter presents estimates of tax evasion in all former Yugoslavian 
countries for various years and taxes during the last two decades. The scarcely 
available fiscal and national accounts data only allow us to provide approximate 
estimates. Nevertheless, they are a useful contribution to the existing literature in a 
unique sense since tax evasion is estimated for the very first time for some of the 
countries. The main aggregate assessment of tax evasion is based on data for shadow 
economy and tax burden. More specific measures of evasion are provided for some 
single taxes that are based on data discrepancies from different sources. Lastly, 
implications are derived for the controls of tax evasion and observed tax collections 
The third chapter performs an empirical analysis on the determinants of tax 
morale in former Yugoslavian countries, including both individuals’ attributes and 
contextual variables. Survey data from the 2008 European Values Study is used as 
well as fiscal and economic macro-data. The results reveal that the outcomes for 
individual level variables are in line with the previous scientific literature. Moreover, 
the results on contextual variables and the interactions associated with tax burden, 
shadow economy and economic freedom provide new insights concerning tax morale 
in these countries. 
 
. 
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Chapter 1: Fiscal policy in former Yugoslavian 
countries (2001–2014): Stylised facts and budget 
elasticities 
1.1. Motivation 
Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, its former republics (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) have taken 
different paths; however, one common denominator for all of them is the European 
path. On their way towards the European Union (EU), all countries have had to 
undergo a process of transition from a centrally planned, socialist economy towards 
a free market economy. This also includes guaranteeing fiscal stability by 
implementing new economic policies and institutional reforms. 
The previous literature on fiscal issues in former Yugoslavian countries is 
mostly focused on single country crises and other specific topics. By contrast, this 
paper adopts a cross-country perspective and deals with the main fiscal aggregates 
such as deficit, total expenditures and total revenues. Our main target is to partially 
fill this gap using cross-country data. Cross-country studies involve the possibility 
of comparing evolutions from a common starting point; secession is a type of natural 
experiment. Moreover, it increases the sample size to perform econometric analysis 
on basic fiscal aggregates, and this is relevant insofar as the time span of the series 
is limited at this point in time. In particular, we compile an integrated database1 and 
then focus on two targets. First, we analyse the evolution of key fiscal aggregates 
                                                 
1 Collecting homogeneous data for the former Yugoslavian republics was a cumbersome task. This 
likely explains why cross-country studies have been so scarce until now. Since there was no uniform 
source for all countries, the data had to be collected individually for each country. Bearing in mind 
the different governing structures, various institutions such as State Statistical Offices, Central Banks 
and Ministries of Finance had to be contacted. Furthermore, in order to confirm their lack of data, 
research on the availability of data within European institutions was also necessary. Based on 
availability, in five countries, the respective Ministries of Finance were taken as a relevant source for 
all fiscal variables present in the database. The exception was Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the 
Central Bank has the task of collecting and presenting consolidated data for the whole country. 
Although in some countries the data is usually publicly available on their websites, others kept them 
for their own internal use. This meant establishing a necessary contact and seeking data through 
formal channels. After compiling all the necessary information, the raw data had to be recalculated to 
a joint unit of measurement, which in our case was GDP percentage. We would like to take this 
opportunity to thank all of those who helped and participated in the extensive and time-consuming 
data-collection process. 
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with the aim of general macroeconomic stability and for the process of integration 
into the EU in particular, and evaluate the dynamics of tax revenue composition. 
Unfortunately, the lack of data on expenditure composition makes this kind of dual 
budget analysis impossible. Second, we pool data to compute the elasticity of deficit, 
taxes and expenditure to the estimated output gap. This aspect is relevant from a 
policy standpoint insofar as fiscal stability depends not only on structural deficit but 
also on the effect of the business cycle on both revenues and expenditures. A positive 
output gap involves additional tax collection and a reduction in some expenditure 
programmes (for instance, unemployment insurance, thanks to a cut in the 
unemployment rate). Combining both effects, a reduction in deficit is expected. 
To accomplish our targets, this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, 
some stylised facts about the former Yugoslavian republics are presented, which are 
followed by a survey of the available literature on fiscal issues in former Yugoslavian 
countries is provided in Section 3. Section 4 presents data and specifications, as well 
as a cluster analysis merging countries of interest with all EU countries. Section 5 
analyses the relationship between the economic cycle and fiscal variables, including 
deficit, expenditure and taxes. Finally, Section 6 focuses on policy implications and 
extensions of this research. 
1.2. Fiscal choices in the new republics: Some stylized facts 
The Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was a country founded in 1946 
in the aftermath of the Second World War. It was formed by six equal republics and 
two autonomous provinces. Although it was federalized, the country operated on a 
centralized decision-making mechanism led by the leader, Marshal Josip Broz Tito. 
The years before his death in 1980 were the ones that brought more and more 
instability, since economic differences were increasing among the republics.  
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Figure 1: Regional GDP per capita  
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Figure 1 shows the economic differences per countries measured in GDP per 
capita. Slovenia and Croatia were the most successful ones, which explains their 
aspirations towards a different governing system based on decentralization and 
democracy that would eventually give them more autonomy. Their intentions were 
materialized in the autumn of 1990 when they proposed transforming Yugoslavia 
into a loose federation of six republics. The response from the Presidium of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to their independence ambitions was 
negative. In response to these reactions, both Slovenia in December 1990 and Croatia 
in May 1991 held referendums for independence with over 90% pro-independence 
results. They declared independence on the 25th of June 1991, while Macedonia 
declared its independence exactly three months later in September 1991. Later 
Bosnia declared independence in early 1992. However, the conflicts between the 
newly formed countries were already too intense. A three year war period between 
Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia had begun. It resulted mainly in civil casualties, 
permanent deterioration of interstate relations and impoverishment of the states. As 
in any armed clash, no positive effects were achieved. 
After the end of the wars in 1995, a difficult process of recuperation for all 
newly independent countries had begun. On top of that, Serbia and Montenegro 
(known as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) were bombed 4 years later during the 
6 
three months NATO bombing in 1999 in an attempt to stop the conflicts in Kosovo 
between the Yugoslavian Army and the Kosovo Liberation Army, which was 
founded as an insurgency by the Kosovar Albanians. Therefore, our time samples 
are adapted to avoid the disturbing effects of those shocks in war and post-war years 
in all countries. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The case of Bosnia is the most particular one of all former Yugoslavian 
countries. After the Dayton agreement, a peace agreement reached in 1995 that ended 
the Bosnian war, its borders and structure were defined. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) is composed of two entities, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is 
a highly decentralized entity and the Republic of Srpska, a highly centralized entity. 
Together with them, there is an autonomous District of Brčko, established in 2001 
(Antic 2010). All three of these regions have a certain level of fiscal autonomy in the 
field of direct and indirect taxation. The former two, as bigger entities, also have 
their own budget and institutions. Therefore, there is no central government. The 
asymmetry between the two Entities and a District is managed by a Fiscal Council. 
It coordinates the fiscal policy in BiH to ensure macroeconomic stability and fiscal 
sustainability of the State. This is done by setting primary deficit goals, disregarding 
goals for expenditures or revenues (also Antic 2010). 
One of the main improvements reached in the development period in terms of 
fiscal progress was the introduction of the value added tax (VAT). Prior to that there 
was an indirect tax, which was used as a substitution. The VAT was introduced from 
1.1.2006. Consequently, there was a slight improvement in total tax revenues noticed 
after this date. However the revenues decreased after the crisis emerged. As in other 
former Yugoslavian countries, the period of tax decrease coincided with the increase 
in expenditure (2008 and onwards). At the same time, the output gap became 
negative, which matched the governments rise in expenditures (2012). This was also 
the year when the tax revenues slightly increased. This was a genuine increase since 
the VAT rate in Bosnia remained unchanged at 17% together with the corporate and 
personal income tax rates who are at a rate of 10%.2  
Croatia 
Although Croatia also finished its war period in 1995, unlike Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, it had a faster progress. It became a member of the World Trade 
Organization in 2000 and a member of NATO in 2009. On top of everything, Croatia 
joined the European Union in July 2013. Up to date, neither Bosnia and Herzegovina 
nor Serbia are members of these organizations. What enabled Croatia to make a 
                                                 
2 Source: Investment Opportunities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Foreign Investment Promotion 
Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016 
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faster progress was a better starting position in terms of economic development. As 
mentioned above, it had the second highest GDP per capita of all Yugoslav republics. 
The exposure of Croatian economy to foreign capital is very high. Only 
tourism alone has a 30% influence on the country’s GDP and 30% influence on 
employment.3 Furthermore, there is a slight and steady growth in expenditure, which 
comes as a consequence of decentralization. Namely, general government spending 
in EU member states and Croatia is influenced by government fragmentation and 
political stability, where higher government fragmentation leads to an increase in 
government expenditures (Vučković and Basarac Sertić, 2013). Although Croatia 
was primarily a highly centralized state after the first decade of its independence 
marked by the civil war, nowadays the public sector of Croatia is composed of three 
basic levels: Central government, counties and municipalities. This was a 
consequence of the Framework Programme of Decentralization 2004-2007 which 
led to the founding of the Croatian Decentralization Commission. This body had 
objectives to improve the legal and strategic framework for fiscal decentralization, 
assist in proposing and implementing reforms in financing local self-governments 
and to make recommendations for providing adequate financial resources to local 
governments.4 
Macedonia 
Macedonia is one of the best examples how stability in the region was a 
necessary condition for a successful reform. The peaceful separation of Macedonia 
in 1992 gave it a head start alongside Slovenia in terms of time for making fiscal 
reforms (Diamond and Last, 2013). However, Macedonia was also not as 
economically strong as Slovenia, which had a double of GDP per capita. This 
difference prevented the countries from advancing at the same pace. Since fiscal 
reforms also included achieving certain levels of decentralization, this process was 
closely monitored by the European institutions. What proved to be the problem in 
this case was the lack of leadership and coordination in transferring fiscal issues from 
the central to the local levels. Furthermore, this lack of efficiency and coordination 
within the Macedonian central government affected the overall level of government 
efficiency. This proved that the fiscal reforms and decentralization were mainly used 
for achieving political objectives.5 The implemented Programme of Decentralization 
2004-2007 within the same Framework that Croatia participated in was a turning 
point in the Macedonian case as well. 
                                                 
3 Source: Travel & Tourism Economic Impact 2015 Croatia, World Travel & Tourism Council, 2015 
4 Source: Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Economies: Case Studies from the Balkans and 
Caucasus, United Nations Development Programme, 2005 
5 Source: Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Economies: Case Studies from the Balkans and 
Caucasus, United Nations Development Programme, 2005 
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We can notice how a steady development of expenditures and tax revenues 
brought it to a level which it maintained throughout the last decade. The fluctuations 
of the output gap have proven to be very low in comparison to other former Yugoslav 
countries. This also meant that there was no effect on the expenditure and tax revenue 
series. 
Montenegro 
After the break-up of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, a new 
country of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was founded. It was made by two former 
republics Yugoslav republics Serbia and Montenegro and continued to exist until 
2003. After that it changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro, which lasted only 
three years. In a referendum in mid-2006, the independence vote won by a tight 
55.5% (55.0% was the necessary threshold) thus making Montenegro the last 
seceding Former Yugoslav republic.6  
The economic boom after the secession lasted quite shortly, before the 
economic crisis struck and heavily influenced its economy. The government 
expenditures were indeed stable only for a year, after when the expenditures 
increased. On the other hand, a bigger problem for the Montenegrin economy are the 
low tax revenues. Furthermore, a low starting point in terms of GDP per capita, made 
it one of the worst performing republics of the former Yugoslavia alongside Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
Serbia 
Serbia has gone through a lot of events in its recent history after the break-up 
of Yugoslavia, which made her path towards reforms very unstable. After the war in 
Bosnia, the country was struck by conflicts in Kosovo against the Kosovar Albanians 
in 1999. In retaliation for crimes committed in these conflicts NATO bombed the 
entire country for 3 months, having as a single goal the destruction of power and 
communication resources. Four years after, in 2003, after the country finally threw 
away the socialist regime of the 1990s and changed to a democratic government 
another shock occurred. The Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjić, was assassinated in the 
midst of a fight against organized crime. Afterwards occurred the independence 
declarations of Montenegro in 2006 and Kosovo in 2008. 
Slovenia 
Slovenia is one of the most advanced countries that emerged from the Former 
Yugoslavia. As soon as they declared independence, the Slovenes adopted a new 
constitution that enabled a transfer to a democratic society and a market oriented 
economy. However, what was really important in the process were the good initial 
                                                 
6 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5043462.stm 
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conditions it had, being the most developed republic of the Former Yugoslavia 
(Peternelj, 2005). It became a member of both the European Union and NATO in 
2004, while it joined the OECD in 2010. Figure 13 shows us how Slovenia performed 
fiscally in the last decade. However, what we cannot see is the main consolidation 
that occurred prior to joining the EU and the Eurozone in 2004. From 2002 to 2005 
there were increases in VAT rates and restraint expenditure that contributed to the 
steady public finance (Jemec et al, 2013). 
As in all other countries we analysed, the growth period in the 2000s was 
stopped with the emergence of the crisis. This disturbed the cycle ad caused the 
economy to enter in a recession in Slovenia as well. Being a part of the EU, Slovenia 
had to adopt the same measures as the remaining 26 member countries. At the end 
of 2009, the European Commission launched an excessive deficit procedure for 
Slovenia which had to reduce its fiscal deficit below 3% GDP (Setnikar Cankar and 
Petkovšek, 2014). 
In terms of fiscal deficit, the year 2013 is especially interesting in the case of 
Slovenia. Although the deficit amounted to only 4.3% of GDP that year, the actual 
number should have been around 15%. Namely, there was a recapitalization of 
several banks that needed to be performed. This bailout had a price of 11.1% of GDP. 
However, it was excluded from the state budget and went straight on to increase the 
public debt. Therefore, the expenditure line has no extreme changes (Jazbec, 2014). 
Although it is the best performing country of the Former Yugoslavia, Slovenia also 
has room for progress. It was showed in a paper from 2007 that public spending in 
Slovenia is relatively inefficient, inflexible, and poorly targeted. As a consequence, 
Slovenia appears to perform inefficiently in the areas of health, education and 
employment (Mattina and Gunnarsson, 2007). This is to show that even when having 
stable expenditure performances one should think about improving the structure of 
expenditure in order to achieve optimum government expenditure efficiency. 
1.3. Brief survey of literature 
The literature on fiscal matters in former Yugoslavian countries is still 
underdeveloped, and the reason for this becomes clear when attention is paid to the 
use of cross-country data in analytical papers. 
Concerning papers on the main dynamics of fiscal variables, most focus on the 
influence of the Great Recession. Mencinger and Aristovnik (2014) compare the 
cyclical behaviour of EU countries’ fiscal policies between 2004 and 2012 with fiscal 
policy measures taken in Slovenia during the economic crisis. The adopted necessary 
consolidation measures implemented by Slovenia did not vary substantively from 
other EU countries. The policy debate on the size of fiscal multipliers was also 
present in former Yugoslavian countries. Grdović Gnip (2015) used a structural 
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vector auto regression (SVAR) approach to conclude that output reacted negatively 
to a tax shock and positively to government spending shocks in Croatia from 1996 
to 2011. The cumulative output multiplier following four quarters is 2.45 for 
government spending, similar to that found by Šimović and Deskar-Škrbić (2013). 
Jemec et al. (2013), using an SVAR approach for Slovenia from 1995 to 2010, made 
a similar discovery: one-time fiscal spending shocks tend to increase output 
(multiplier equals 1.6), while a tax shock decreases it (multiplier at 0.4); however, 
effects become irrelevant in the long run (more than three years). Koczan (2015) also 
analyses the period of the Great Recession and identifies the main problems in their 
public sectors: wages and pensions constitute a very rigid and large share of the 
overall spending. The latter combined with a decline in public revenues due to the 
crisis disturbed the budget balance, which consequently led to a build-up of public 
debt. Future challenges to be faced are structural changes and fiscal consolidations, 
particularly in the area of reviewing current expenditures. However, the set of 
countries is slightly different insofar as it relies upon the concept of the “Western 
Balkans”. This term is used to denominate Balkan countries that are not members of 
the EU. With the former Yugoslavian countries in mind, this excludes Croatia and 
Slovenia, but includes Albania and Kosovo.7  
When the focus is on the elasticity of budget balances expressed in relation to 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to GDP changes, there are virtually no papers on 
these issues in former Yugoslavian countries. However, Slovenia and Croatia are 
covered in some cases by papers on EU countries. The existing cross-country studies 
on budgetary elasticity in European countries are summarised in Table 1. In 
particular, Viren (2014), who analysed the EU15 countries over the period 1970–
2011, found that deficit elasticities with respect to output growth appear to be around 
0.46. He sets up a specification that includes public deficit, revenues or expenditure 
on the left side of the equation and a lagged endogenous variable, real GDP growth, 
general government debt and real interest rate on the right side. Using akin samples, 
Staehr (2008) with EU27 and Fincke and Wolski (2016) with 10 new EU member 
countries obtained similar elasticities of 0.496 and 0.337, respectively. Nevertheless, 
Tujula and Wolswijk (2007) and Kabashi (2014) obtained much lower coefficients 
for the same elasticity by using a similar methodology. Both specifications include 
the budget balance as the dependent variable with country-specific dummies. 
However, the former performs panel regressions, while the latter uses generalised 
method of moments (GMM) estimates. Vegh and Vuletin (2015), on the other hand, 
                                                 
7 Beyond the central focus of our paper, fiscal decentralisation in Western Balkan countries is 
analysed by Mazllami and Osmani (2014). They reveal a significant number of problems in local 
public finances and suggest the creation of legal mechanisms for the allocation of grants, as well as 
the introduction of improvements in the administrative and managerial capacities of the 
municipalities. In the same vein, Diamond and Last (2003) confirm a lack of strategic planning for 
budget system reforms in all former Yugoslavian countries. 
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only deal with the cyclicality of taxes; they divide their sample into developed and 
industrialized countries to obtain a tax index whose base is a weighted average of 
personal income tax, corporate income tax and value-added tax (VAT). The 
estimates of the tax index (tax revenues) are performed using country fixed effects, 
with the regressor being the cyclical component of the real GDP.  
A second set of papers aims at computing elasticities using a different 
methodology. Instead of relying upon econometrics, global elasticities are estimated 
as the aggregation of individual elasticities of both expenditure and revenue 
components. Bouthevillain et al. (2001) measure their sensitivity with respect to 
GDP by using an elasticity formula, which reflects the response of the budget balance 
to changes in economic activity, to obtain an elasticity of 0.53. Similarly, in other 
papers that analyse the OECD and EU28 countries, such as Mourre et al. (2014) and 
Girouard and André (2005), the overall cyclical sensitivity of the budget is measured 
by the semi-elasticity of the budget balance (as a percentage of GDP) with respect to 
the output gap. In these studies, the overall budget elasticity is computed using the 
individual cyclical elasticities of the four categories of taxes (corporate tax, personal 
tax, indirect tax and social security contributions) and the one expenditure item 
(current expenditure), weighted by their respective shares in GDP. In these cases, the 
influence of the output gap variable was between 0.4 and 0.5, calculated as an 
arithmetic average for the group of countries in the sample. Another paper with 
similar methodology is Altar et al. (2010), which deals with Romania and obtains a 
lower result of 0.290. 
  
12 
Table 2: Cross-country studies on budgetary elasticities 
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Table 2: Cross-country studies on budgetary elasticities, Part 2/2 
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1.4. Fiscal variables: data and preliminary analysis 
Our sample covers the period 2001–2014, but the starting point is not the same 
in all cases due to the reasons explained below. Public deficit is defined as “net 
lending/borrowing”. This position of the budget balance is considered, according to 
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Government Finance Statistics Manual 
(GFSM) 2014,8 to be “the basic indicator of the fiscal balance, measured from 
‘above-the-line’ as revenue minus expenditure”. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and Slovenia, the fiscal data was obtained from the Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS) data portal of the IMF. Owing to the unavailability of earlier data, 
the series for Bosnia and Herzegovina starts in 2005. In the case of Croatia, no data 
before 2002 was used because the reporting standard changed from the GFS 1986 to 
the GFS 2001 in mid-2004. Thereafter, the calculations were only performed 
retroactively for the previous three years. Time series data for Macedonia and 
Montenegro start at nearly the same time, 2005 and 2006, respectively. The data for 
Macedonia were available in the monthly Bulletin of the Ministry of Finance of the 
Republic of Macedonia.9 As for data regarding Montenegro, the time series begins 
in 2006, the same year Montenegro declared independence. The data were obtained 
courtesy of the Ministry of Finance of Montenegro.10 Lastly, the time series for 
Serbia was available in the monthly Bulletin Public Finances issued by the Ministry 
of Finance of Serbia.11 Owing to a lack of data for the autonomous province of 
Kosovo and Metohija, this region was not included in the coverage for the Republic 
of Serbia. Furthermore, after the declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo 
appears in international databases as a separate country. However, since the time 
series data in the GFS data portal of the IMF begin in 2011, the authors decided to 
exclude Kosovo from the analysis. 
While data sources are different for each country, homogeneity is guaranteed 
by the fact that in all cases it is based on the IMF’s GFSM. Data for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia are presented according to the GFSM 2014, while 
Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro use the GFSM 1986.12 As for the country level, 
                                                 
8 Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2014. 
9 http://www.finance.gov.mk  
10 http://www.mf.gov.me  
11 http://www.mfin.gov.rs  
12 Nevertheless, the compatibility of all three data sources in this sense is not questionable due to the 
following explanation from the IMF’s GFSM 2014 (Appendix 1. Changes from the GFSM 2001 and 
GFSM 1986): “Another balancing item in the GFS framework is the overall balance, defined as net 
lending/net borrowing adjusted through the rearrangement of transactions in assets and liabilities that 
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in all cases it covered annual13 data on general government and all extra-budgetary 
funds. 
Table 3: Main descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Observations 
Deficit -2.99 -3.17 6.60 -15.02 66 
Expenditures 41.94 42.22 60.31 31.50 66 
Total revenues 38.95 39.50 45.29 27.66 66 
Personal income tax 3.82 3.19 5.77 2.03 56 
Corporate income tax 1.63 1.57 3.18 0.59 56 
Value added tax 10.33 10.36 14.67 7.88 56 
Excises 3.95 3.91 5.44 3.19 56 
Customs 0.92 0.79 2.64 0.00 56 
Other tax revenue 1.49 1.07 4.13 0.17 56 
Social contributions 12.06 11.96 15.24 8.37 56 
Output gap 0.06 -0.51 6.63 -2.69 78 
Notes:  All variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP. Fewer observations for tax 
category data is due to lack of data for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The GDP data source for calculating the output gap was the World 
Development Indicators from the World Bank. The unit of measurement for GDP is 
constant 2011 international dollars converted using purchasing power parity rates. 
The output gap was computed using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and 
Prescott, 1997) over a sample from 1993 to 2015. The parameter λ was set at 4 
according to the Ravn-Uhlig frequency rule (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). The variable is 
defined as follows: 
1 100
GDP series
output gap
filtered GDP series
 
   
 
 
[1] 
According to the formula, a positive output gap emerges when the actual output 
is greater than the potential output.14 
The mid-2000s still saw rapid growth across the region largely driven by 
external borrowing for consumption and construction. Furthermore, this period 
                                                 
are deemed to be for public policy purposes. … It is the equivalent of the overall deficit/surplus in the 
GFSM 1986, but determined using the accrual basis of recording.” 
13 Ideally, a fiscal dataset that could enable a more sophisticated analysis would count on quarterly 
data, such as Profeta and Scrabosetti (2017). 
14 The advantages of using the output gap instead of the observed GDP growth rates are discussed in 
more detail in section 4. 
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matched the comfortable global environment at the time and increasing confidence 
in the convergence process of these countries with the EU (Roaf et al., 2014). 
Knowing this makes it easy to explain the peak in output gap that was reached for 
all six countries in 2008. Until the appearance of the economic crisis, a positive 
output gap was working well for all countries, with the actual output being above the 
potential output (Figure 1). During this period, the economies were working at more 
than full capacity (“overheating”). After the recession, however, the situation 
changed dramatically. The imbalances that the recession brought made the former 
Yugoslavian economies very vulnerable. A spillover effect reached these countries 
by 2009, when their budget deficits reached all-time lows in the first decade of the 
21st century. The impact was manifested in the continuance of below-potential 
growth, high unemployment and fragile financial markets (Roaf et al., 2014). The 
linkages with international trade partners made the countries vulnerable which, 
combined with low levels of employment, high public debt and current account 
deficits, greatly impacted the countries. 
Figure 2: Output Gap (as % GDP) 
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A graph showing budget deficit data is presented in Figure 2. Former 
Yugoslavian countries managed to cope with the fiscal pressures after their 
secessions. It is clear that all countries have a joint downwards slope. The reasons 
for this can be found in the consequences of the world economic crisis from 
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2007/2008, which started in these countries with a delayed effect. In fact, even 2007 
was a downturn point for every country except Croatia, whose deficit took a 
downwards turn in 2008. Nevertheless, all countries reached their low points 
between 2012 and 2014, with the sole exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A sharp 
decline in capital inflows led to economic recessions and modest recoveries 
thereafter. The former was caused by an overall decline in international trade and 
transactions. The economies were vulnerable externally and linked by trade to all 
major countries that were themselves experiencing problems as a result of the crisis. 
Another interesting feature of Figure 2 is the case of Slovenia, whose budget deficit 
more than tripled in 2013, only to recover in the following two years. This is due to 
an emergency recapitalisation of the country’s banks, performed by the government 
by pumping 3.6 billion euros into the banking sector in order to avert an international 
bailout. 
 
Figure 3: Budget balance (as % GDP) 
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Figure 3 shows the dynamics of public expenditure across all six former 
Yugoslavian countries. The countries with the highest expenditure in terms of GDP 
percentage are Serbia and Slovenia. On the other hand, Macedonia has the lowest. 
With the exception of Macedonia, which has also had a steady increase in 
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expenditure, the countries can be described as having a tendency towards 
expenditure growth over time, especially after the crisis. Therefore, tight fiscal 
policies and austerity measures were recommended by both the EU and the IMF. 
These two institutions had the last word in terms of external funding and providing 
advice to Balkan countries. With this in mind, the conclusions made for the former 
Yugoslavian countries by these institutions were that there was a need to build up 
the flexibility of the economy and increase the capacity of the economy to grow. 
Practically speaking, this would imply a reduction in debt, the implementation of 
structural reforms that would attract investments to the trading sector and an increase 
in savings as a consequence of economic growth (Koczan, 2015). 
 
Figure 4: Expenditures (as % GDP) 
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Total revenue has also had similar dynamics for all six of our countries of 
interest (Figure 4). The early 2000s were a time of fiscal consolidation and 
restructuring. A VAT was introduced and public revenues were stabilising after the 
war in the 1990s. However, steady development and slight growth were replaced by 
sharp declines in public revenues after the crisis. The turning point came in the years 
2008 and 2009, when revenues in all countries started to plummet. Nevertheless, 
stabilisation occurred after 2011 when every country except Macedonia began 
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experiencing growth. Throughout the entire period observed, the process of 
European integration is apparent in the customs contributions, which seem to have 
decreased in all countries. The collapse in tax revenues, together with the difficulty 
in scaling back spending, resulted in a significant deterioration of fiscal positions and 
a build-up of debt (Koczan, 2015).  
 
Figure 5: Total revenues (as % GDP) 
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In order to analyse tax revenue composition and the evolution of tax revenues 
over time, we pool the countries of interest with a wide set of neighbouring countries. 
If the common patterns are strong enough, the existence of a cluster inside the pool 
should be detected. In particular, the analysis includes data of the tax categories in 
34 countries: 26 of these are EU members (excluding Slovenia and Croatia), three 
are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the remaining five 
are former Yugoslavian countries. The time span of the available data ranges from 
2001 to 2014. One former Yugoslavian country had to be excluded from the analysis 
owing to lack of data for tax categories, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
variables used include total tax revenues and their seven tax categories expressed as 
a percentage of GDP: personal income tax, corporate income tax, VAT, customs, 
excise, social contributions, and other taxes. This kind of classification was imposed 
20 
by the availability of data for some countries. Later, the others were adapted so a 
homogeneous dataset could be constructed. The computations were made using the 
Stata 14 statistical package. 
Based on the available data, we use average values for the two seven-year 
periods of 2001–2007 and 2008–2014. The analysis uses the average linkage 
clustering method and Euclidean distance as the similarity or dissimilarity measures. 
We perform a cluster analysis for each period; the corresponding dendrograms are 
presented in Figures 5 and 6. Since we use average linkage clustering and an average 
of all distances between points from different clusters, the Y axis provides a measure 
of such closeness of individual data points. 
 
Figure 6: Dendrogram for tax revenue composition, Period 2001-2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 7: Dendrogram for tax revenue composition. Period 2008-2014 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
In both periods, countries can be organised into five main clusters: two of those 
clusters hold in both periods (Denmark and Sweden on the one hand; and the United 
Kingdom and Iceland on the other), and a third cluster is almost the same in both 
cases (Belgium, Austria, France, Italy, Finland and Norway). These clusters are all 
characterised by having high tax revenues. However, the third cluster, to which more 
countries belong, differs from the two smaller ones for one important reason: social 
contributions in this cluster are somewhat higher than the rest of the countries in the 
sample in both periods.15 
The main feature of concern to us is that four out of the five former 
Yugoslavian republics belong to the same cluster in both periods. In the first period, 
they are joined by the Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Poland, Slovakia, 
the Netherlands, Hungary, Germany and Luxembourg. In the second period, the 
same cluster is subject to some changes, with Estonia joining it and Slovakia leaving 
it. Although they belong to a large cluster, the former Yugoslavian countries are 
closely positioned within the same cluster in both periods. Moreover, the data on tax 
revenue decomposition in Appendix 1 shows that the values of tax variables for the 
                                                 
15 Full data are reported in Appendix 1. 
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three countries placed together in the sub-cluster in both periods all fall within a 2% 
range. 
The only former Yugoslavian country that is located separately from the others 
is Macedonia, which is next to its geographical neighbours, Bulgaria and Romania. 
The reason for the difference in the position of Macedonia in the tree diagram is 
found in the two tax categories that have a joint weight of 70%: the VAT and social 
contributions. On the one hand, VAT constitutes a lower share of the tax revenues in 
Macedonia than in the other former Yugoslavian countries. On the other hand, when 
it comes to social contributions, Macedonia has the lowest percentage of GDP of all 
the former Yugoslavian countries in both periods, with a difference of over 2% of 
the GDP. 
1.5. Econometric analysis of the budget balance elasticity of 
deficits and their components 
1.5.1. Econometric specifications and methodology 
The first dependent variable is deficit and the regressors are output gap and the 
lagged endogenous deficitt-1 (equation 2). As for the remaining elements in the 
equation, i  stands for the country effects, t  for the period fixed effects,   for the 
coefficient of the independent variable,   for the coefficient of the lagged 
endogenous variable and it  for the error term. In order to break down the effect of 
output gap on both sides of the budget, in equations [3] and [4] expenditure or 
revenues replace deficit. As in previous sections, variables are expressed as ratios 
over GDP:16 
1it i t it it itdeficit β output gap deficit           [2] 
1it i t it it itexpenditure β output  expendituregap            [3] 
1it i t it it itrevenues β output  revenug e  sap           [4] 
The methodology used in the analysis is a simple and frequently-used 
procedure for computing elasticities. More sophisticated equations, such as the ones 
used by Bouthevillain et al. (2001), Mourre et al. (2014) and Girouard and André 
(2005), were discarded due to the small sample size.17 As stated above, in the related 
                                                 
16 Moreover, equation [4] is also adapted to analyse the behaviour of the main tax categories. 
17 Bouthevillain et al. (2001) also introduce other variables that take into account discretionary fiscal 
policy measures, in addition to a number of other possible idiosyncratic features of the economy. For 
the European Commission, Mourre et al. (2014) obtain the value of the budgetary semi-elasticity as 
a difference of the corresponding values of revenues and expenditures. Furthermore, they calculate 
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literature some studies used variables other than the output gap. For instance, Viren 
(2014) and Tujula and Wolsvijk (2007) use the growth rate of the GDP. However, 
the output gap is a better option insofar as it captures cyclical positions more 
effectively than simple annual growth rates.18 In addition, other control variables are 
used in the literature (Table 1). In preliminary estimates, we also include 
unemployment and inflation as right-hand variables, but neither were significant. 
Empirical analysis was performed using the statistical software EViews 9.5. 
The basic statistics of the variables are reported in Table 2. A battery of specification 
tests on equation [3] was performed. Concerning the redundancy of both individual 
and period fixed effects, the corresponding tests confirm their relevance. In contrast, 
a Wald test on cross-section slope homogeneity clearly supports the validity of the 
constrained equation assuming common slopes (p-value = 0.78), meaning that 
pooling data makes sense. The Breusch-Godfrey test on AR(1) autocorrelation 
shows that this is not an issue. Moreover, all variables are stationary according to the 
results of both augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC) unit 
root tests. In contrast, the hypothesis of cross-sectional dependence cannot be 
rejected at the 5% level according to the results of the Pesaran CD test (Pesaran, 
2004). For this reason, we report t-statistics computed on ordinary least square (OLS) 
residuals and robust t-statistics computed using panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) to comprehensively deal with both cross-sectional dependence and 
heteroscedasticity (Beck and Katz, 1995). All in all, the results provided by the two 
formulas are essentially the same. 
However, panel OLS is subject to two shortcomings. First, including both fixed 
effects and the lagged endogenous variable leads to the so-called Nickell bias 
(Nickell, 1981). Although this bias is of the order 1/T, and T is not very small in our 
case, the potential bias is not negligible. Second, the potential endogeneity of the 
output gap is a result of the Keynesian effects of public deficit. In order to deal with 
both problems, we also compute a panel GMM estimator. Taking into account the 
small N dimension of the panel, we choose the one-stage Arellano-Bond differenced 
estimator and discarded more sophisticated and informationally demanding 
estimators (two stages or system GMM). A variable number of lagged values of the 
endogenous variable is used as the instrument, constrained by the sample size and 
                                                 
this using data for five different tax categories for the former and unemployment-related expenditures 
for the latter. Both of these kinds of data were unavailable to us for all countries. Girouard and André 
(2005) first applied this approach to the OECD; they used four different tax categories for the revenue 
side and current expenditures (to reflect unemployment-related spending) for the expenditure side. 
18 For instance, if GDP growth rate is 3% in year t, but was -3% over the last three years, it is clear 
that fiscal variables in year t will reflect a negative effect of the business cycle. While using the 
observed growth rate in year t would not capture the cyclical position of the economy (information 
on previous years is not taken into account), the output gap would. The same approach is followed in 
Simon et al (2017). 
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the values of both the Hansen test and Arellano-Bond AR(2) autocorrelation test. In 
most cases, the main results hold using Panel OLS (PLS) or GMM. 
1.5.2. Results 
Results are reported in Table 3. The main result is that the deficit is statistically 
and significantly influenced by the output gap. The coefficients on this variable in 
the first two columns are between 1.02 and 1.70, with t-statistics between 3.43 and 
3.15, respectively. Equations [3] and [4] split the deficit into their two direct 
components, expenditure and revenues. All comments and choices on specification 
[2] discussed above are imposed in both cases. While the ratio of total revenues to 
GDP is not influenced by the cycle, that of expenditures to GDP is, with average 
elasticities around -1.25.19 Hence, deficit elasticity to the output gap is fully 
explained by expenditures. The positive value of the output gap coefficient in 
equation [2], as well as a negative value of the same coefficient in equation [3], 
indicates countercyclical fiscal policy in the considered period. 
  
                                                 
19 In order to check the robustness of results for expenditure and deficit, we used a bias-corrected least 
squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator, originally proposed by Kiviet (1995) and extended by 
Bruno (2003) to unbalanced panels. Whilst short-run effects (β) were lower, the coefficient on the 
lagged endogenous variable was higher and so in the long-run multipliers were more similar.  
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Table 4: Pooled OLS and GMM estimates of specifications [3], [4] and [5]. 
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Output Gap 
1.02 
(3.43)*** 
[2.89]*** 
1.71 
(3.15)*** 
-1.27 
(-3.88)*** 
[-3.01]*** 
-1.20 
(-3.11)*** 
-0.23 
(-1.36) 
[-1.17] 
0.05 
(0.17) 
Deficit (-1) 
0.27 
(2.12)** 
[1.61] 
0.16 
(0.85) 
    
Expenditure 
(-1) 
  0.26 
(6.06)** 
[1.33] 
-0.23 
(-1.46) 
  
Total 
Revenues 
(-1) 
    0.70 
(2.60)** 
[4.53]*** 
0.39 
(1.93)** 
Number of 
observations 
60 54 60 54 60 54 
R2 0.77  0.92  0.97  
Individual 
fixed effects 
0.1213      
Period fixed 
effects 
0.0051      
Wald test 0. 7803      
B-G test 0. 4175  0.1320  0.2741  
Pesaran CD 0. 0446      
Hansen test   0.1328  0.0926  0.2858 
A-B AR(2)  0.8176  0.3873  0.5907 
Method POLS GMM POLS GMM POLS GMM 
Notes: All estimates include both fixed individual and period effects. P-values are reported 
in the case of specification tests. Individual fixed effects and period fixed effects is the F-test 
on the respective redundancy tests. The Wald test is Chi-square statistic value on the null 
hypothesis of cross-country homogeneity in slopes. B-G is the Breusch-Godfrey test of AR(1) 
autocorrelation. Pesaran CD is the Pesaran CD test on the null hypothesis of no 
contemporaneous correlation. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. t-statistics computed using OLS residuals in parenthesis, robust t-
statistics computed using panel corrected standard errors PCSE in brackets (Beck and Katz, 
1995). Instruments in GMM include second and third lagged values for Deficit and 
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Revenues and third and fourth lagged values for Expenditures. Estimates are performed 
using EViews 9.5. 
In order to check the robustness of results concerning the reported inelasticity 
of the ratio of revenues to GDP with regard to changes in the output gap, equation 
[4] is adapted to perform individual analysis of the main tax categories (Table 4). In 
most columns, the output gap is not significant; the two exceptions are the GMM 
estimate for VAT and the pooled OLS estimate for social contributions. However, in 
both cases the parameter is not significant at 5% or less and findings are not robust 
for the estimation method, as they are in the case of deficit and expenditure.  
Table 5: Pooled OLS and GMM estimates of specification [5] 
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Table 5: Pooled OLS and GMM estimates of specification [5], Part 2/2 
Notes: See Table 3. The list of GMM instrument only includes the third and fourth lags of the 
corresponding endogenous variable in the cases of the Personal income tax and Other tax revenues 
and second and third lags in the cases of Corporate income tax, Value added tax, Excises, Customs 
and Social Contributions 
Returning to the results summarised in Table 1, budgetary elasticity in the 
former Yugoslavian countries seems to be higher than in any other European 
country. Our estimates (1.02–1.71) are much higher than the ones in the analyses by 
Mourre et al. (2014), at 0.50, and by Bouthevillain et al. (2001), at 0.49–0.53. Similar 
results are found by Viren (2014), who used the same methodology we did (PLS and 
GMM) to obtain the elasticity of 0.46 for the EU15 countries. However, his measure 
for the economic cycle was the real GDP growth instead of the output gap. 
Nevertheless, the results demonstrated how the public finances of former 
Yugoslavian countries are highly influenced by the economic cycle. Double 
elasticity of public finances in transition countries rather than European ones is not 
a rare finding. This idea is also backed up by the recent developments in literature; 
although not explicitly focusing on the former Yugoslavian countries, Staehr (2008) 
found that in the Eurozone, the effect of the economic cycle on the budget balance 
is twice as strong as in new EU member states. He also concluded that revenues were 
acyclical in new EU member states. Moreover, the results of Kabashi (2014) show a 
stronger effect in Western Balkan countries than in new EU member states. Koczan 
(2016) suggests that the political cycle might be linked to a larger discretionary 
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component of fiscal policy (in this case concerning expenditures) in the Western 
Balkans. 
While our results can also be influenced by the fact that the analysed period 
includes the so-called “Great Recession”, they suggest the strong role of spending 
policies in former Yugoslavian countries as a countercyclical tool; this is in line with 
results by Fincke and Wolski (2016) for new EU member states. However, further 
research on this topic is required in order to determine which mechanisms explain 
the countercyclical nature of public expenditure in former Yugoslavian countries.20 
In particular, we should determine the role played by three complementary 
mechanisms: (1) automatic stabilisers (as unemployment benefits), (2) discretionary 
expenditure programmes implemented for compensating the effects of crisis and (3) 
the rigidity of expenditures: in general, it is an easier task for policymakers to 
increase expenditures during boom times than it is to reduce them in troubled times. 
As for the inelasticity of revenues, this proved to be the case for both European 
and former Yugoslavian countries. Mourre et al. (2014) obtained an elasticity of 0.00 
for an EU28 sample, which they justify by noting a marked cyclical pattern between 
tax revenues and GDP, whose fluctuations offset each other in their ratio. On the 
other hand, Viren (2014) obtained an elasticity of -0.09 for an EU15 sample.  
1.6. Concluding remarks  
The contribution of this paper to the literature on fiscal issues in former 
Yugoslavian countries is threefold. First, we describe the comparative evolution of 
the main fiscal aggregates of all six former republics using a new panel dataset. 
Second, after comparing the composition of their national tax revenues in a European 
context over time, we have seen in the cluster analysis how there are common 
patterns in four of the five analysed countries. Third, we have shown that the output 
gap is highly significant in explaining the evolution of both deficit and expenditures 
over GDP in all countries, but not to account for the evolution of revenues over GDP. 
In fact, the elasticity of expenditures is well above average for EU countries, but the 
elasticity of revenues is below average. Public deficit and expenditures are both 
countercyclical, while tax revenues over GDP remain acyclical.  
Further research is required to disentangle this result; in particular, to shed 
additional light on the relevance of automatic stabilisers, discretionary expenditure 
measures and the rigidity of expenditure programmes. Understanding counter-
cyclical behaviour will help to define sound fiscal consolidation strategies, which is 
particularly relevant when meeting EU fiscal requirements. Concerning tax 
                                                 
20 de Castro Fernández et al. (2018) prove that social transfers, particularly unemployment-related 
expenditures, reflect counter-cyclical behaviour. 
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inelasticity, we should explore the extent and impact of the shadow economy and 
fiscal evasion in the region, and whether they are correlated with the economic cycle.  
Bearing in mind the difficulties in gathering data from heterogeneous sources, 
the improvement of databases for these countries presents itself as a relevant 
objective. A convergence in statistics for all of them would be possible by making 
efforts to participate in international statistical coverage by, for example, Eurostat 
and the IMF. Although there is some presence in these institutions, not all former 
Yugoslavian countries are participating fully. Having homogeneous data sources 
would enable the development of viable, more sophisticated econometric studies that 
could help with policy and institutional design. 
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Chapter 2: Tax evasion in former Yugoslavian 
countries 
2.1. Introduction 
Empirical research has extensively confirmed the negative consequences of tax 
evasion for a wide array of issues including fiscal stability, tax collection and tax 
fairness (Atkinson et al., 2011). Focused on non-OECD countries, Yakovlev (1999) 
explained how tax evasion also distorts budget constraints in the legitimate sector 
and distorts prices, Brueckner (2000) proved that tax evasion can limit the benefits 
from decentralization, and Eilat and Zinnes (2002) damage the credibility of 
governments and incentivize firms to exit the official economy. In spite of this policy 
and political relevance of the problem, literature concerning tax evasion focused on 
the former Yugoslavian countries is scarce and mostly reporting casual evidence of 
estimates for single countries. This article aims at filling this gap in some extent.  
Due to acute data shortcoming affecting the analysed countries, our 
methodological approach is mostly based on the available estimates of the “shadow 
economy”. The broad concept of shadow economy (also known as hidden, informal, 
underground, undeclared, grey or black economy) is used when dealing with both 
legal and illegal activities. A commonly accepted definition describes it as all 
activities which remain unregistered when they could contribute to the official GDP. 
According to a taxonomy established by Lippert and Walker (1997), which was 
further expanded by additional remarks from Schneider (2000) and Schneider and 
Williams (2013), the legal and illegal activities are also split between monetary and 
non-monetary depending on the type of transaction.21 They consider tax evasion to 
be all unreported work-related income and barter of legal services and goods. We 
will only deal with legal activities that fall under the shadow economy, i.e. shadow 
economy in its narrow sense. More precisely, we will be estimating the amount of 
tax which remains unpaid and hidden from officials. Tax evasion is mostly observed 
in deliberately concealed transactions originating from production of goods and 
services. These are all under-reported and unreported income and work.  
                                                 
21 In this 2x2 matrix, illegal monetary activities are criminal acts such as trade in stolen goods, drug 
dealing and manufacturing, prostitution, gambling, smuggling, fraud or human, drug and weapon 
trafficking, while the illegal non-monetary ones are barter of stolen goods, drugs or theft. When it 
comes to legal transactions, a further division is made between tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
Monetary tax evasion is all work related income that is unreported, while monetary tax avoidance is 
employee discounts and fringe benefits. Non-monetary tax evasion is barter of legal services and 
goods, while non-monetary tax avoidance is all do-it yourself work and neighbour help. 
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Our main contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we provide an 
estimate of tax evasion for the first time for some countries. Second, we provide 
estimates for previous years when it comes all countries. The article is organized as 
follows. Section 2 presents a survey of available literature on tax issues in former 
Yugoslavian countries. Section 3 deals with potential tax evasion measures. Section 
4 contains the estimates of tax evasion regarding total economy and individual taxes. 
Section 5 provides some implications of the findings, in light of penalty provisions, 
tax evasion control and tax collection for each country. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2.2. Survey of literature 
The bulk of papers on tax issues in the former Yugoslavian countries are 
descriptive and single-country focused. Furthermore, the main drawback of the 
existing literature has been a lack of econometric analysis, with some exceptions like 
Primorac (2014)22, Yuldashev and Khakimov (2011)23 and Šimović et al. (2014).24 
Nevertheless, even without this kind of analysis, many authors have given policy 
recommendations based on legislation reviews, quantitative measures and their 
experiences and opinions. A brief overview of tax system literature is presented in 
Table 1. 
  
                                                 
22 The proposed fiscal equalisation model indirectly alleviates inequalities in the fiscal capacities of 
local government units in Croatia, through mitigating the differences in the capacity for collecting 
revenue from the PIT and surtax. Its effectiveness is even more evident when compared with the 
existing equalisation system, which is complex, administratively demanding and expensive. 
23 This paper derives the wage elasticities of labour force participation in Serbia, among others. The 
empirical analysis entailed two steps using the Heckman estimation method. Results show that on 
average the probability of labour force participation is positively related to the gross wage. 
24 The survey results showed that there is no high and broad consensus of Croatian tax experts 
regarding the perspectives of tax reforms. 
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Table 6 Survey of tax system literature per country found in RePec and Scopus 
country paper topic recommendation 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Antić 
(2014) 
Efficiency of 
the VAT 
system in BiH 
Simplification and modernization of the 
administration VAT and narrowing of the scope 
of exemptions of the public sector, financial and 
postal services. 
Croatia Bratić 
(2012) 
Efficiency of 
the CIT tax 
expenditures 
in Croatia 
Reform of tax expenditures in the CIT. Their 
complete annulment or replacement with 
transfers (subsidies) from the state budget. 
Prebble 
(2014) 
Does Croatia 
need a general 
anti-avoidance 
rule? 
There would be benefit of introducing a general 
anti-avoidance rule. The type of rule should be 
found from examples of similar jurisdictions. 
Bratić and 
Urban 
(2006) 
Tax 
expenditures 
in Croatia 
The various exemptions and tax privileges 
complicate the tax system, increase the costs of 
tax collection and open up windows for tax 
evasion. This should necessarily lead to mini-
reform of the tax system in the future. 
Tesche 
(2001) 
Tax 
Harmonization 
Looking at bureaucratic problems for cross-
border trade and investment is important, with 
sales taxes or retail sales staying in the country 
of purchase. 
Gadžo and 
Klemenčić 
(2014) 
Stopping tax 
avoidance 
Introduction of the general anti-avoidance rule 
in Croatian tax legislation. 
Cindori 
(2015) 
VAT during 
the financial 
crisis 
When it comes to further raising the VAT rate, 
there is a question of reaching the limits of 
Croatian tax capacity and real possibilities of 
setting its goals. 
Serbia Raonić et 
al. (2016) 
Solving tax 
offences and 
evasion 
Training of tax authorities in the field of 
international treaties on avoidance of double 
taxation. Setting the frequency of tax controls. 
Aničić et 
al. (2012) 
Tax policy in 
Serbia 
A reform of the tax system by transferring the 
tax burden from the field of highest tax evasions 
(earnings) to the field where it is the most 
difficult to perform tax evasions (VAT). 
Arsić and 
Krstić 
(2015) 
Formalization 
of the shadow 
economy 
Close the VAT gap. Adjust the economic 
policies so that the reduction in the shadow 
economy is accomplished by shifting business 
from the informal to the formal sector, without 
affecting the GDP. 
Slovenia Beynet, 
and 
Leibfritz 
(2009) 
Keeping 
public 
finances 
sustainable 
Reduce the tax distortions in the labour market 
while at the same time creating enough revenues 
for social security. Improve the design of 
environmental taxes. 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Concerning papers devoted to the analysis of tax evasion, Ott (2004) concluded 
that there is an increasing need in Croatia to improve the statistical system and also 
to reform the tax system; its simplicity and efficacy were particularly in focus. 
McGee et al. (2009), Bejaković (2009) and Culiberg and Bajde (2014) dealt with 
issues of tax evasion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, respectively, 
only by assessing the justification of tax evasion from survey results. Madzarevic-
Sujster (2002) is the only author from the scant literature who tried to estimate the 
extent of tax evasion. The analysis was performed for Croatia in 1994-2000 by 
making separate estimates of the evasion of some direct and indirect taxes. She used 
the difference between actual and potential GDP to proportionately obtain theoretical 
values for personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT), social security 
contributions (SSC), excise tax, sales tax and value added tax (VAT). Following that, 
she calculated the evasion percentages in two scenarios in order to obtain a lower 
and an upper estimate. More recently, tax evasion in more than one former 
Yugoslavian country has been analysed in the context of wider samples. Christie and 
Holzner (2006), in the part of their paper that deals with tax evasion, analysed PIT, 
SSC, VAT and excise taxes for selected European countries, including Croatia and 
Slovenia. Beginning from national accounts aggregates, they constructed estimates 
of the corresponding tax bases. Then they proceeded to compute estimates of 
compliance rates for each available year. Reckon (2009) and Barbone et al. (2013) 
included Slovenia in their EU27 sample while estimating the VAT gap. A report by 
Murphy (2011) for the Tax Justice Network provided an estimate of tax evasion for 
145 countries, albeit without the participation of Montenegro and Serbia. Later, 
Schneider (2015) estimated tax losses due to shadow economy in EU28 (including 
Croatia and Slovenia) and some OECD countries by introducing some corrections to 
the methodology used by Murphy (2011). 
On the causes of shadow economy, Mikulić and Galić Nagyszombaty (2013) tried 
to uncover the causes of shadow economy in new European Union (EU) member 
states and Croatia. Their analysis identified government expenditures, the index of 
economic freedom, development levels and freedom from corruption as significant 
factors influencing the shadow economy. Franić and Williams (2015) used 
Eurobarometer data from Croatia in 2013 to demonstrate that there is no association 
between participation in undeclared work and the perceived level of penalties and 
risk of detection. Also, the strong association between engagement in undeclared 
work and the level of tax morale motivated their recommendation to introduce more 
preventive rather than punishing measures. In Williams and Franić (2016), the same 
authors proposed a novel way of explaining shadow economy as a violation of the 
social contract that exists between the state and its citizens. Their analysis of data for 
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Croatia confirms that the wider the gap between state morality (codified laws and 
regulations) and civic morality (values and beliefs of citizens), the greater the 
likelihood of participation in the informal economy. Lastly, there was a paper by 
Nenovski (2012), who used a different, qualitative approach, to locate causes, 
consequences and the scope of grey economy in the Republic of Macedonia. 
Bejaković (2015), in his review of literature on shadow economy in Croatia, also 
identified the persistent problem of lack of official statistical data, which results in 
significantly overestimated economic activity during periods of growth and 
underestimated activity during recessions, which usually gives rise to 
overestimations and biased fiscal projections. Nevertheless, several papers have 
dealt with the challenges of shadow economy and tax evasion. Barić and Williams 
(2013) and Williams et al. (2015) provided overviews of policy measures towards 
undeclared work in Croatia and Macedonia, respectively. They also compared these 
with the policy measures used in European Economic Area and concluded in both 
papers that, unlike the many preventative measures, there are very few curative 
measures, especially incentives to formalise undeclared work. 
 
2.3. Potential tax evasion measures 
Table 2 shows an overview of methodologies to estimate tax evasion (Alm 2012). 
Similarly, Schenider (2000) made a classification of widely-used methods to 
estimate shadow economy. Unfortunately, due to the current lack of data, the only 
available methods for calculating tax evasion in former Yugoslavian countries are 
indirect measures.25 More precisely, calculations based on shadow economy 
estimates and on some estimated gaps.  
                                                 
25 Direct measures are unavilable since only institutions authorized by the state perform audits and 
surveys. To the authors’ knowledge, in the cases of all former Yugoslavian countries, no such efforts 
have been made. The remaining indirect measures as well as models cannot be estimated due to lack 
of input data (such as currency transactions, economic activity originating from physical input, etc.). 
On the other hand, modern measures would be inadequate for estimating tax evasion in whole 
countries since they would require time-consuming surveys or experiments which would not give 
robust results due to small sample issues. 
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Table 7 Potential tax evasion measures 
Traditional 
Direct Audits of individual returns - Taxpayer Compliance Measurement 
Program (TCMP) and Taxpayer Compliance Measurement 
Program (TCMP) in the USA 
Survey evidence 
Tax amnesty data 
Indirect Estimate evasion via some “gap” that can be estimated (income 
reported on tax returns and income in the national income 
accounts; income and expenditures in the national income 
accounts; official and actual labour forces; expected VAT 
revenues and VAT actually collected; etc.) 
Transactions financed by currency 
Shadow economy 
Currency demand approach (Any “excess” in currency demand, 
or the amount unexplained by the explanatory variables, is then 
attributed to the shadow economy and, by extension, the amount 
of tax evasion.) 
Gap between the official output and the predicted “true” 
economic activity from the physical input estimates the amount of 
tax evasion 
Model DYMIMIC - when shadow economy effects may show up 
simultaneously in multiple markets (a model links the unobserved 
variables to observed indicators; and then a structural equation 
model specifies causal relationships among the unobserved 
variables) 
Modern 
measures of reported income from individual tax returns as a proxy for evasion (on the 
assumption that one’s total income must be divided between reported income and 
unreported) 
field experiments 
consumption-based or tax deduction-based measures as an indicator of tax evasion 
survey-based approaches in which particular occupations are examined 
luminosity as measured from outer space to measure “true” economic activity, which 
can be compared to official income accounts to measure evasion 
original sources, such as information on cigarette tax evasion using discarded cigarette 
packs to measure the degree to which smokers in a single jurisdiction evaded the 
jurisdiction’s cigarette taxes 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Alm (2012) 
Murphy (2011) estimated the sum of evaded tax using shadow economy data. He 
multiplies the size of estimated shadow economy of a country in GDP% by the 
percentage of overall tax burden in order to obtain the value of evaded tax. This 
Chapter 2: Tax evasion in former Yugoslavian countries 
     37 
methodology was followed in Schneider (2015), who also calculated the tax losses 
that result from shadow economy activities. However, he took into account several 
other factors in his procedure. Firstly, he subtracted 33% of the shadow GDP 
accounting for legally bought material (already taxed) and double counting issues. 
Having in mind that shadow economy activities are mostly paid in cash, legal 
activities paid in cash are subtracted from the total figure in order to obtain shadow 
economy activities. As for double counting, these are a consequence of statistical 
offices adding some shadow economy activities to the official GDP.  Secondly, he 
subtracted 10% from the remaining amount to account for illegal foreign 
transactions. Finally, he multiplied the remaining amount of value-added of a 
country, which consisted mostly of black labour, by taxes and social security 
contribution burden. This provided different results for obtained tax losses than the 
previous research, which the author justified with the fact that the results of the 
previous research were unrealistically high.  
In the rest of our paper, besides using the shadow economy approach, we also 
focus on methods of estimating tax evasion via certain gaps, which is an approach 
based on discrepancies in national accounts data. Woon Nam, Parsche and Schaden 
(2001) estimated the value-added tax evasion as the difference between the 
hypothetical and the collected VAT revenues in a given fiscal year. When calculating 
the hypothetical VAT revenues they had to deal with several issues such as the fact 
that some activities that generate the VAT base fall under special tax regimes. A 
weight of the activities that fall under the normal VAT rate is then used as the total 
position. Additionally, certain regions within a country might have different taxation 
rules than the rest of the country; regional statistics are required in order to resolve 
this issue. There is also a time discrepancy between the origin of the tax liability and 
the collection of the corresponding tax. In this case, 10% of the value for the VAT 
base of the preceding year was allocated to the current year. Afterwards, they 
obtained the VAT evasion as one minus the “tax collection performance ratio”, 
which is a ratio of calculated and hypothetical VAT revenues. 
Gebauer, Woon Nam and Parsche (2003) calculated VAT evasion for selected EU 
states. They broke down household final consumption into 32 types of goods and 
services and computed estimates of the average VAT rate for each of them. This 
gave them a relatively precise estimate of the applicable rate for household final 
consumption. In the process, they made several adjustments such as corrections for 
time lags between the creation of the tax liability and the actual payment, and 
corrections for suspensions of tax liabilities and other types of tax waiving.  
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A study that calculated the VAT gap in EU28 by Poniatowski et al. (2016) is the 
most recent and most comprehensive attempt so far to calculate tax evasion, to our 
knowledge. This study was preceded by Barbone et al. (2013) and Reckon (2009), 
both applying the same “top-down” approach. Nevertheless, the 2013 and 2016 
studies used higher estimates from direct communications and used a different data 
source. They all used two components measured in order to calculate the VAT gap: 
the theoretical VAT Total Tax Liability (VTTL) and the amount of VAT actually 
collected. These were then combined to estimate the VAT gap as a formula of 1-
VAT/VTTL. The VTTL is composed of adjusted household consumption liability 
and unrecoverable VAT on intermediate consumption, on inputs to gross fixed 
capital formation, and on government consumption. 
Estimating tax evasion based on gaps is mostly done for VAT and via the top-
down approach, according to Fiscalis Tax Gap Project Group (2016). However, in 
some EU countries there have also been estimates for PIT, CIT and SSC, which 
employed the bottom-up approach using micro data.26 
2.4. Tax evasion estimates 
In order to estimate tax evasion in a transparent manner we must rely exclusively 
on publicly available data. Even when appropriate data is available, our estimates 
still depend on that data’s availability, accuracy, frequency of publishing and regular 
revision. The lack of country-specific statistical data limited using some 
methodologies when calculating tax evasion. In the pursuit of a homogeneous source 
of data for analysing tax evasion, we checked for the presence of former Yugoslavian 
countries in international databases and indices.27 Our global estimate of tax evasion 
is based on shadow economy data. Bearing in mind the available data, we also have 
explored the option of relying upon an alternative indirect method, i.e. estimating 
                                                 
26 When looking at the type of data used in the process of estimating tax evasion, there are two kind 
of approaches depending on the origin of the data: a micro- and a macroeconomic approach. The 
former, microeconomic, compares the income declared by the taxpayer at a micro level with data 
obtained through sample surveys or observed after the auditing activity of the national tax authorities. 
On the other hand, the latter, macroeconomic, is also known as the top-down approach since it is 
based on comparison of fiscal data from Ministries of Finance with aggregate data from national 
accounts. Since there is no micro data for former Yugoslavian countries that could help us with the 
micro approach, in this paper we pursue the second solution. 
27 The presence of former Yugoslavian countries in international databases can be described as none 
other than heterogeneous. Varying from one country to another, there is data for longer and shorter 
periods of time. However, a common denominator for all is that in the last 10 years there is notable 
convergence and that they all participate in relevant surveys and indexes. Further information can be 
seen in Appendix 2. 
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gaps for the most exhaustive taxes. In particular, we estimated tax evasion on the 
CIT and the VAT. Due to unavailable data, it was impossible to make estimates for 
other taxes using this methodology. 
2.4.1. Total tax evasion: estimate using shadow economy data 
The shadow economy data are taken from Mai and Schneider (2016).28 According 
to their definition, the shadow economy includes all of the economic activities that 
are deliberately hidden from official authorities for various reasons. Ranging from 
monetary and regulatory to institutional ones, they respectively include avoiding 
paying taxes, avoiding governmental bureaucracy and practicing corruption. They 
estimate a MIMIC model where shadow economy is the latent variable that is 
determined by a set of significant causal variables: tax burden, regulatory burden, 
unemployment rate, self-employment rate and economic freedom index. This model 
results in a MIMIC index of the trend of the size of the shadow economy. In their 
final step Mai and Schneider (2016) calibrate this index in order to calculate the size 
of the shadow economy as percentage of GDP using 1999 as the base year. 
Figure 1 shows that the countries with the smallest shadow economy are Croatia 
and Slovenia. Coincidentally, these are the countries that have advanced the most in 
European integration. The remaining four countries have much higher results. 
Specifically, their averages hover around 35% of GDP. Nevertheless, from 2010 to 
2013 when the time series end, there is a decreasing trend of the shadow economy in 
all countries except Croatia and Slovenia. 
                                                 
28 A more recent paper by Medina and Schneider (2017) includes updated estimates of shadow 
economy with new observations for 2014 and 2015. However, in this version, they dropped 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. When re-estimating evasion for the remaining countries using 
these figures we notice generally lower values of tax evasion, but similar dynamics through time. This 
refers especially to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia, while Croatia exhibits a different path only 
in the first half of the estimated time period, and later returns to its usual course. 
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Figure 8 Shadow economy in former Yugoslavian countries (as % GDP) 
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on Mai and Schneider (2016) 
The second component in calculating tax evasion is tax burden. It is a parameter 
based on observed tax collection (tax revenues including social security 
contributions) as a percentage of GDP. Data for calculating tax burden was obtained 
from the Government Finance Statistics data portal of the IMF (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia), corresponding Ministries of Finance 
(Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia), as well as World Development Indicators 
(GDP value). Nevertheless, the compatibility of all three data sources in this sense is 
not questionable. The fiscal data is collected under GFSM 2014 and GFSM 1986, 
both GFS frameworks by the IMF, which guarantees homogeneity of this kind of 
data compiled under different manuals. On the other hand, the GDP values in current 
local currency units from WDI are the same values as in other databases. 
Table 3 reports our estimates, based on all available data29  on shadow 
economy and tax burden. The estimates were obtained according to the methodology 
proposed by Schneider (2015) and is explained in Section 3. However, tax evasion 
is, in short, the product of the corrected shadow economy estimates multiplied by tax 
burden. The results show how much tax could have been collected if the size of the 
shadow economy was zero. Therefore, the previously presented data on shadow 
                                                 
29 Available in Appendix 3 
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economy is embedded in our estimate of tax evasion. It is important to stress that 
here we also make the assumption that all shadow economy activities are produced 
and grasped within the official GDP30. Since we have no knowledge of the actual 
percentage share of shadow economy, we make the assumption that it is 100%. This 
provides upper limit values to our estimate. 
Table 8: Total tax evasion estimate based on shadow economy (GDP %) 
 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia 
2001      5.80% 
2002  5.86%    6.24% 
2003  4.85%    6.34% 
2004  5.35%    6.13% 
2005 8.33% 5.31% 5.27%  8.42% 6.18% 
2006 8.06% 5.00% 4.78% 8.09% 7.48% 5.89% 
2007 8.01% 5.27% 5.02% 7.08% 6.66% 5.62% 
2008 7.28% 5.44% 5.37% 7.69% 6.80% 5.81% 
2009 7.89% 6.17% 5.23% 6.71% 6.97% 6.20% 
2010 8.35% 6.16% 4.68% 6.52% 8.16% 6.52% 
2011 9.14% 6.25% 5.03% 6.61% 7.32% 6.54% 
2012 8.92% 6.56% 4.66% 6.30% 7.05% 6.74% 
2013 8.25% 6.46% 4.35% 6.01% 5.94% 6.61% 
average 8.25% 5.72% 4.93% 6.88% 7.20% 6.20% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Results show that tax evasion is highest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while 
Macedonia has the lowest tax evasion percentages. Furthermore, the dynamics is also 
heterogeneous. Regressing tax evasion on individual time trend yielded a non-
significant coefficient for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, positive coefficients 
in the case of Croatia and Slovenia, and negative in Macedonia and Montenegro31. 
Table 4 compares our results with previous single country estimates. 
                                                 
30 All contemporary methodologies for collecting national accounts data, such as SNA 2008 or ESA 
2010, are directed towards expanding their scopes in order to include most illegal and hidden 
economic activities in the GDP. Even then, calculating the exact share of shadow economy presents 
a cumbersome task. 
31 The results of the tests for trends in time per each country are reported in Appendix 4 
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Table 9: Results from studies on tax evasion concerning former Yugoslavian 
countries (GDP %).  
year country 
Murphy 
(2011) 
Schneider 
(2015) 
Raczkowski 
(2015) 
Our 
estimate 
2011 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12.64% - - 9.14% 
Croatia 7.48% 6.30% 6.46% 6.25% 
Macedonia 10.64% - - 5.03% 
Montenegro - - - 6.61% 
Serbia - - - 7.32% 
Slovenia 9.85% 5.30% 8.16% 6.54% 
2012 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   - - 8.92% 
Croatia   6.30% 6.46% 6.56% 
Macedonia   - - 4.66% 
Montenegro   - - 6.30% 
Serbia   - - 7.05% 
Slovenia   5.30% 8.23% 6.74% 
2013 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   - - 8.25% 
Croatia   6.30% 5.68% 6.46% 
Macedonia   - - 4.35% 
Montenegro   - - 6.01% 
Serbia   - - 5.94% 
Slovenia   5.20% 7.65% 6.61% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Results from the Murphy (2011) show significantly higher estimates than our 
own, which is due to having a different definition of shadow economy. Schneider 
(2015) explained in his paper how those results were overestimated, which we 
summarized in Section 3. Moreover, he provided his calculation of tax evasion and 
gave technical notes on how to implement his methodology. This led us to adopt the 
same approach, which we explained earlier in this section. Our estimate of tax 
evasion for Croatia is in line with his results, while the one for Slovenia is slightly 
higher in our case. As for other countries, some of them have not been considered 
previously. This is the general case for Montenegro and Serbia, whose tax evasion is 
estimated here for the first time ever, to our knowledge. Furthermore, the same is 
true for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia if we disregard the overestimate by 
the Murphy (2011). Lastly, the estimate by Raczkowski (2015), when compared to 
our estimates and those made by Schneider (2015), shows results that are slightly 
higher for Croatia and significantly higher for Slovenia. The reason for this might be 
the fact that the estimates by Raczkowski (2015) are obtained as a product of the 
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shadow economy level and an average rate of total tax burden. This rate, by 
definition from the Word Bank Database, refers the amount of taxes and mandatory 
contributions payable by businesses. It does not account for allowable deductions 
and exemptions, and excludes taxes such as personal income tax, value-added taxes, 
sales taxes or goods and services taxes. Bearing this in mind, we can only interpret 
his results in the context of corporate income tax gap. 
2.4.2. Evasion on single taxes: Estimates using tax gaps 
Besides providing estimates of tax evasion based on shadow economy data, we 
explore another option while being limited by the scarcity of available data. This is 
the estimate of tax evasion of some single taxes in Croatia and Slovenia. Unlike the 
previous estimate, this one is based on a gap between national accounts and fiscal 
data. Having opted for the top-down approach, we collected data from various 
sources in order to be able to measure these discrepancies from different sources of 
data. Fiscal data on different tax revenues was obtained from the Government 
Finance Statistics data portal of the IMF. The effective tax rates for corporate income 
tax and value-added tax were collected from two TAXUD reports (Spangel et al. 
2016 and Poniatowski et al. 2016). Lastly, we defined tax bases according to Mourre 
et al. (2014) and collected the appropriate data from national accounts through 
AMECO. When estimating tax evasion via tax gaps, we apply the following simple 
procedure step by step: 
1) Collect data on tax bases from national accounts data contained in AMECO 
(gross operating surplus corresponds to corporate income tax; household 
final consumption expenditure corresponds to VAT). 
2) Apply effective tax rates from TAXUD reports to the tax bases in order to 
obtain potential tax revenue. 
3) Subtract the actual tax revenues obtained from Eurostat from potential tax 
revenues. 
4) After obtaining the amount of evaded tax, translate it from local currency 
units to GDP percentage value. 
Results are shown in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
Table 10 Corporate income tax evasion 
 CIT 
evasion 
Croatia Slovenia 
2000   2.33% 
2001   2.30% 
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2002   2.06% 
2003 1.42% 2.28% 
2004 1.70% 2.07% 
2005 1.63% 1.29% 
2006 1.59% 1.42% 
2007 1.35% 1.13% 
2008 1.04% 1.63% 
2009 -0.02% 1.75% 
2010 0.11% 1.48% 
2011 1.24% 1.73% 
2012 0.84% 1.74% 
2013   1.70% 
2014   1.64% 
2015   1.61% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Corporate income tax refers to the legal obligation of a company to the 
government of its residence. In countries of Former Yugoslavia, this is present in the 
form of a payment which is taken from the profit of the company. In cases when a 
company is doing business without a profit, it is not subject to paying such taxes. 
Legally or illegally avoiding paying taxes in cases when there is profit is considered 
tax evasion. The results in Table 5 show that in the three analysed countries corporate 
income tax evasion amounts to a substantial part of GDP. In the observed period, 
both countries experienced a decrease in corporate tax evasion. Croatia especially 
showed a plummet in tax evasion during the years of the economic crisis. This might 
have been due to the bad economic environment causing local companies to 
experience negative results in their business, which simultaneously resulted in lower 
evasion. When it comes to Slovenia, it can be seen that this country had a steady 
decrease of evasion during the years of the crisis. This might have been related to 
this countries’ membership to the EU and access to many stability solutions. 
Table 11 Value added tax evasion 
VAT 
evasion  Croatia Slovenia 
2010   0.85% 
2011   0.64% 
2012   0.92% 
2013   0.60% 
2014 1.19% 0.75% 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration 
It was the European Union that used its vast resources to initiate a tax group 
that to help calculate the effective rates of the value-added tax. These figures would 
later aid in calculating the potential values of VAT, which when compared to the 
actual collected ones gave the final result of tax evasion. As we can see for both of 
the countries in question, the evasion is set around 1% of GDP. 
2.5. Result implications 
2.5.1. Potential role played by existing controls on tax evasion 
Besides the punishment policy, which is features negative incentives, there are 
other ways of dealing with the issue. Since the problem of tax evasion is related 
mostly to unreported income, there are three different paradigms outlined by Alm 
(2012) on how tax evasion should be controlled. We begin from these three as a 
starting point and make some additional remarks applying them to former 
Yugoslavian countries: 
 Policy enforcement paradigm – This refers to the detection and punishment 
of tax evasion. The authorities are responsible for making improvements in 
this area by increasing the quantity and quality of audits, increasing penalties, 
applying them consistently and exposing some cases publicly in order to raise 
awareness. 
 Service paradigm – Responsibility is given to the tax administration to  make 
efforts to become more taxpayer friendly, promote tax education, improve all 
means of communication and make all necessary forms and regulations easily 
available to the general public. 
 Trust paradigm – This challenge is again set upon the government, which is 
supposed to advertise tax compliance as the “right” type of behaviour, avoid 
decisions that abolish sanctions to tax cheaters and address inequities in order 
to raise the tax morale of the citizens. 
When it comes to these three paradigms, several points mentioned can be seen 
as key issues in the development of policies for coping with tax evasion in former 
Yugoslavian countries. 
Out of all six former Yugoslavian countries, the most complex one in terms of 
tax administration is Bosnia and Herzegovina. This country consists of two entities, 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, as well as the 
Brčko district, which all have legislative, judicial and executive authority. At the 
country level, the Indirect Taxation Authority is responsible for the collection of all 
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indirect taxes (VAT, Customs and Excises and others). On the other hand, there are 
also tax administrations at the entity level whose jurisdiction includes direct taxes 
(CIT, PIT, property taxes, SSC, etc.). The complexity of the issue makes it very 
difficult to execute the tasks in the first and second paradigms. Due to the potential 
for overlapping jurisdictions, taxpayers are inadvertently put in a position of being 
unaware of possible tax obligations they have or of being able to cleverly go around 
them. The lack of fiscal coordination and harmonisation within departments of tax 
authorities is more likely to cause problems and eventually lead to a widening fiscal 
deficit, according to Antic (2015). Nevertheless, the revision of main fiscal policy 
measures by Koczan (2015) showed that Bosnia and Herzegovina has moved in a 
positive direction in 2013 as a result of introducing administrative measures to 
improve tax collection. More precisely, experts agreed in a survey by Lazović-Pita 
and Štambuk (2015) that advances should be made towards introducing progressive 
personal income tax and excise duties on luxury products. 
After Macedonia, the country with lowest average tax evasion in the examined 
period is Croatia. Since the early 2000s, the government has been introducing VAT 
exemptions, higher income tax deductions and lower PIT and CIT rates (Koczan, 
2015). When this was combined with good enforcement of tax laws with favourable 
rates, tax evasion was kept under control at around 5% (paradigm 1). However, after 
2009, tax evasion is shown to be rising in Croatia. This period coincides with the 
period of recession and an accompanying increase in public debt which Croatia 
suffered persistently from 2008 to 2014. The vulnerability of their economy in this 
period has therefore resulted in an increase in tax evasion. Nevertheless, IMF (2015) 
concluded that Croatia is showing signs of recovery, as indicated by tax revenues. 
This might be a result of the government’s reaction in 2012, which included a 2% 
VAT increase, a temporary solidarity tax and an introduction of a 12% tax on 
dividends and profit distribution. Still, there is evidence from authors such as Gadzo 
and Klemenčić (2014), who argue that Croatia has yet to develop a coherent 
legislative framework suitable for curbing tax avoidance. 
The main fiscal problems for Macedonia, according to IMF (2015a), are mostly 
concentrated on the expenditure side of the budget. Revenues, in the absence of 
further tax policy changes, are maintained at a stable level and sometimes even over-
perform. It is also demonstrated by a low level of tax evasion, the lowest among 
former Yugoslavian countries. The changes that might have influenced low evasion 
are tax cuts in the early 2000s as well as introduced improvements in tax 
administration between 2006 and 2008 (Koczan, 2015). We also mentioned the strict 
laws on taxes that prescribe high financial penalties for tax offences. Even a 
minimum penalty can result in paying amounts worth at least 10 minimum wages. 
Montenegro was the last of all Former Yugoslavia republics to gain its 
independence. With a relatively small economy, it is an easy task for its authorities 
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to administer tax control. Since the country is exhibiting a fall in tax evasion years 
after its independence, we can say that this might be attributed to increasing trust in 
the new country’s institutions and to taxpayers having higher tax morale due to a 
stronger feeling of national identity. Furthermore, after the secession, there were two 
tax rate cuts for PIT (2007) and SSC (2008), which further contributed to reducing 
tax evasion (Koczan, 2015). These actions from paradigms 3 and 1, respectively, 
demonstrate how a subtle approach to building tax discipline and the development 
of tax morale contributes to the legal and timely payment of taxes (Božović, 2016). 
Serbia’s fiscal policy was mostly aimed towards the expenditure, rather than 
the revenue, side. Furthermore, in the study by Koczan (2015), we see that the 
enforcement of fiscal rules was also weak. Having moved focus from taxes, the 
amount of VAT fraud significantly increased (Raonic and Vasic, 2014). In light of 
turbulent political changes, it comes as no surprise that tax evasion followed a 
dynamic path. Nevertheless, the consolidation measures in 2012 regarding VAT, 
CIT, PIT, excise duties and non-tax revenues (Koczan, 2015) led to a significant 
decrease in tax evasion. These actions belonging to paradigm 1 were reflected in our 
estimate as a fall in tax evasion from 7.05 in 2012 to 5.94 in 2013. Yet many actions 
remain to be carried out in the future, especially those from paradigm 3, where tax 
compliance should be promoted in order to increase the tax morale of taxpayers. 
Lastly, Slovenia, the most advanced country of Former Yugoslavia, has the 
most stable tax evasion rate, hovering at around 6 % of GDP. Being in the Eurozone, 
Slovenia is obliged to constantly fulfil the Maastricht criteria, which define fiscal 
stability as one of the key factors. Furthermore, activities on promoting tax 
compliance are directly instructed from EU institutions. All necessary paradigms for 
controlling tax evasion are therefore covered. The roots of this behaviour are found 
in comprehensive tax reforms early in the transition process when accession to the 
EU was a powerful objective (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2000). The years 
between 2004 and 2007 are when Slovenia adopted several amendments to the 
existing tax system. These mostly referred to simplifications in the existing tax 
system, decrease of statutory rates and introduction of many tax reliefs (Majcen et 
al., 2007). Bearing this in mind, it comes as no surprise that these years are the only 
ones that saw tax evasion rates below 6% GDP. However, after the boom came the 
crisis and its aftermath, which brought a rise in tax evasion and a destabilization of 
the whole fiscal system. At the end of 2009, the European Commission launched an 
excessive deficit procedure for Slovenia embodied in austerity measures (Setnikar 
Cankar and Petkovšek, 2014). 
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2.5.2. Implications from comparisons with actual observed tax 
collection 
Khwaja and Iyer (2014) analysed whether countries were fulfilling their 
potential regarding tax collection. All six former Yugoslavian republics are included 
in the list of 61 analysed countries. In their paper, there is a term commonly 
understood as the “tax gap”, which presented the difference between the legal 
potential tax revenue and the actually-collected tax revenue. The revenue potential 
is obtained by using econometric methods. They employ a broad data set and a 
regression approach to find the tax potential, which they later compare to the actual 
tax collection. 
According to Khwaja and Iyer (2014), this difference suggests that in these 
countries there is a greater or lesser incentive to evade taxes and a greater or lesser 
load on tax administration. A negative tax gap would imply that the country is 
collecting more than what taxpayers can afford given their economic situation, which 
eventually creates an incentive for tax evasion. Table 7 shows the average results 
concerning the tax gap for the period 2000–2010, as well as concerning our estimate 
of tax evasion. In addition, we add OECD and EU15 averages in order to facilitate 
comparison.  
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Table 12 Actual observed tax collection for the period 2000-2010 
 Shadow economy 
(Schneider et al., 
2010) 
Tax gap (Khwaja 
and Iyer, 2014) 
Tax evasion 
(our estimate) 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
33.50% -10.65% 7.99% 
Croatia 31.94% 0.26% 5.49% 
Macedonia 37.48% -1.01% 5.06% 
Montenegro 30.54% -10.05% 7.22% 
Serbia 31.43% -11.77% 7.42% 
Slovenia 26.10% -0.61% 6.07% 
OECD 20.00% -0.11% - 
EU15* 18.39% -0.56% - 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Notes: *missing Luxembourg 
While Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia all have negative tax-
gap values, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia all have a tax gap that hovers around 
zero. Combining this result with our estimates on tax evasion and Mai and 
Schneider’s (2016) figures on shadow economy, we conclude that legal tax loads 
(including tax rates but also the remaining elements of taxes) are over the average.  
 
2.6. Conclusions 
The contribution of the article to the literature is twofold. Firstly, to the best of 
our knowledge, we make the first estimates of tax evasion for some countries. As 
previously mentioned in Section 2, tax evasion is estimated for some former 
Yugoslavian countries within wider samples. However, for Montenegro and Serbia 
this paper provides, to our knowledge, the very first publicly available tax evasion 
estimate. Secondly, we make estimates over periods of eight years and longer. Using 
our homogeneous data set, we make the earliest tax evasion estimates for 2001 and 
the latest for 2013. In contrast, the available literature makes only single-year 
estimates. 
Regarding the implications of our results, we consider the tax evasion 
phenomenon in the context of three paradigms for controlling tax evasion, i.e. policy 
enforcement, service and trust. Finally, we analyse tax collection in all countries to 
show that relative to their complete economies, tax collection is performed at a high 
level. 
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Although the process of collecting data and exploring various options for 
estimating tax evasion was a cumbersome task, the final results do present an 
advance in this field concerning these countries. Further research on potential 
reasons for these results may concern law changes in the past. Another potential role 
might lie in differences in legal penalty provisions for tax evaders across countries. 
A brief attempt is shown in Appendix 5, where we provide an overview of fines for 
serious tax offences committed by a legal person32. After measuring tax evasion in 
the entire area of Former Yugoslavia, the authors’ future research concerning tax 
evasion aims to identify the determinants of tax morale of the population and 
establish its determinants. 
 
 
  
                                                 
32 Under these offences we considered the cases when the taxpayer fails to pay VAT, fails to pay VAT 
within the specified time limit, fails to request for issue of the identification number for VAT purposes, 
fails to keep accounts in sufficient detail to enable a proper and timely charge of VAT, etc. The full 
table can be found in Appendix 5. 
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Chapter 3: Determinants of tax morale in former 
Yugoslavian countries 
3.1. Introduction 
The transition period to market economy in former Yugoslavian countries 
involved deep changes in both institutions and the legal framework. The tax vector 
was one of the mostly affected, including the introduction of new taxes33, innovations 
in tax administration and the way tax institutions were operating (Grabowski, 2005). 
The time gap until establishing a fully functioning tax administration and policy 
enforcement gave many opportunities for tax evaders to act. Hence, it is not 
surprising that tax evasion in former Yugoslavian countries was high when compared 
to the rest of EU countries (Crnogorac and Lago-Peñas, 2018). 
In this context, the aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of the new tax 
frameworks on tax morale, instead of those opportunities for tax evasion. Tax morale 
is a concept usually defined as the “the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes which arises 
from the moral obligation to pay taxes as a contribution to society” (Cummings et 
al., 2005). In particular, we examine the determinants of tax morale in former 
Yugoslavian countries, testing the effect of contextual variables changing across-
countries and over the transition period. Those contextual variables include both the 
level and dynamics of the tax burden, the extent of shadow activities and perceived 
tax evasion, and an index of economic freedom. 
The source for individual-level variables and tax morale is the European 
Values Study from 2008. Concerning contextual variables, data sources include the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), corresponding Ministries of Finance, the 
Heritage Foundation and lastly the findings of Mai and Schneider (2013). 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we rely upon both individuals’ 
attributes and contextual variables that expand the informational potential of our 
model rather than solely using individuals’ attributes variables. Second and to the 
best of our knowledge, it is the first analysis focused on all former Yugoslavian 
countries. 
                                                 
33 Value added tax (VAT) was introduced for the first time in Bosnia and Herzegovina (in 2006), 
Croatia (1998), Macedonia (2000), Montenegro (2003), Serbia (2005) and Slovenia (1999) 
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Our main results regarding individual level variables show that stronger tax 
morale is found in the case of older people, females and those with higher education, 
religiosity, national pride, confidence in parliament and not justifying bribe. 
However, it drops when individual income increase. Furthermore, when it comes to 
contextual variables, we find that tax morale is weakened by a larger tax burden and 
shadow economy. In contrast, it is strengthened by a higher economic freedom index. 
Finally, the analysis of interactions shows that: i) that a higher tax burden reduces 
the positive influence of national pride on tax morale; ii) a higher shadow economy 
also tends to erode tax morale insofar as it reduces the positive effect of intrinsic 
morale of citizens who reject all kind of bribe; and iii) that the negative effect of 
higher individual income on tax morale is reduced when economic freedom is higher. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a review of the available 
literature on tax morale in former Yugoslavian countries is provided. Section 3 
presents the three groups of hypothesis, econometric specifications and data. Section 
4 contains the results with a discussion subsection. Section 5 concludes. 
3.2. Literature review 
The roots of dominant empirical research on tax morale reach the late nineties, 
when its expansion begins with the first widely available data by the World Values 
Survey and the European Values Study. However, tax morale existed and was 
previously understood as the relationship between the taxpayer and the government, 
taxpayers’ reaction to government fiscal policy or government spending (Lewis, 
1982). Vogel (1974) was one of the first to use survey data in order to analyse 
“taxpayer attitudes and perceptions in Sweden with particular attention to income 
tax evasion and factors that explain it”. Later, it was Kirchler (1999) who mentions 
tax morale in the same context and illustrates it as “acceptance of other peoples’ anti-
tax behaviour”.34 Prior to disengaging ourselves into further research, we feel 
obliged to address several topics regarding data. Namely, the tax morale variable is 
extracted from the justifiability of cheating on taxes. Based on this understanding it 
                                                 
34 In later literature review of early 2000s, Torgler who, alongside many other authors, provided 
extensive investigative work on tax morale, both empirical and experimental. His contributions to the 
literature analyse tax morale in relation to religion (Torgler, 2006), institutions (Torgler, 2003), trust 
(Torgler, 2003a), audit courts (Torgler, 2004), corruption (Torgler, 2004a), direct democracy 
(Torgler, 2005), tax compliance (Cummings et al., 2005), conditional cooperation (Frey and Torgler, 
2007), governance quality (Torgler et al., 2007), local autonomy (Torgler, 2007) and shadow 
economy (Torgler and Schneider, 2009). Besides this extensive work in relation to many different 
aspects, there are also papers by other authors such as Feld and Frey (2007) who argued that tax 
morale results from a complicated interaction of deterrence measures and responsive regulation. 
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should be noted that such measurements are not free from biases. Martinez-Vazquez 
and Torgler (2009) report that “a taxpayer who has engaged in some illegal behaviour 
in the past may tend to excuse (even justify) this kind of behaviour and so declare a 
high tax morale. Furthermore, people might overstate their willingness to pay taxes, 
as there are no sanctions involved; similarly, individuals may be reluctant to respond 
honestly to a survey question, given the delicate nature of tax compliance.” 
Nevertheless, we consider that having a large enough sample may alleviate the 
pressure of possible subjectivity of questioned individuals.35 
Data for empirical research usually comes from public sources and varies 
between national and supranational surveys. On the one hand, supranational surveys 
cover more than one country in their sample and exist through various organizations 
and continents. The main data sources for papers using this kind of data are usually 
the World Values Survey and the European Values Study (besides the ones from 
previous paragraph, also see Martinez Vazquez and Torgler (2009); Halla (2012) and 
Doerrenberg and Peichl (2013)). On the other hand, national surveys include the 
Bank of Italy Survey, which resulted in papers by Barone and Mocetti (2011), Lubian 
and Zarri (2011).36 
Tax compliance, although generally accepted as “the right thing to do”, is not 
as equally widespread when we look at specific groups of people based on some of 
their individual attributes. Personal status variables include age, gender, marital 
status, level of education, employment status, income level and religiosity.  
Firstly, tax morale among young people is lower, since they are considered to 
be less trusting (Song and Yarbrough, 1978). Besides differences in age, tax morale 
can vary depending on gender as well. According to Stern et al. (1993), women have 
stronger beliefs than men about consequences for self. In continuation, they say how 
beliefs about consequences for self can reliably predict willingness to pay through 
taxes. Torgler and Valev (2010) also find evidence for strong gender differences. 
Women are significantly less likely to agree that corruption and cheating on taxes 
can be justified. Song and Yarbrough (1978) again conclude that younger people 
who are less trusting towards public institutions (i.e. tax authorities) are usually 
                                                 
35 Having this said, we have made an effort to face all challenges of using cross-sectional surveys, as 
well as survey data in general. We desire not to read in the data more than they can tell us. Therefore, 
we keep in mind the necessary limitations associated with an empirical analysis of the sort provided 
in our paper. 
36 We set aside the experimental literature on tax morale that uses data from properly designed and 
conducted surveys. These are, for instance, experimental works by Molero and Pujol (2012) or 
Blaufus et al. (2015). 
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single, lower on the education and income ladders. The latter two are confirmed by 
Agger et al. (1961) who examined two "indicators of social class" – education and 
income. What they observed was that those of higher educational attainments are 
more likely to be trusting than those scoring lower as well as that higher incomes 
result in increasing proportions of politically trusting, although the increases are not 
great. Andreoni et al. (1998) regarding tax compliance found that those whose tax 
burdens which are easier to evade, such as self-employed individuals, pay a smaller 
share of taxes. When it comes to religiosity and tax morale, Torgler (2006) found 
strong evidence that religiosity factors exert a systematic influence on tax morale. 
As can be found in the last column of Table 1, tax morale usually increases with age, 
education level and religiosity; while it decreases with income level. Furthermore, it 
is rather stronger with women, married or widowed; and weaker with couples living 
at home, people who are part-time employed, self-employed or unemployed. 
Secondly, feelings regarding politics, institutions, government or nation are 
additional drivers of tax morale. The level of tax ethics has a negative relationship 
with anti-government feelings (Song and Yarbrough, 1978). Kirchler et al. (2008) 
talk about personal, social, and national norms. While personal norms present 
internalized standards of behaviour and social norms are concerned within reference 
groups (such as friends, acquaintances, family, colleagues etc.), national norms are 
seen as cultural standards. One might have a low tax compliance due to personal 
beliefs or due to beliefs that non-compliance is widespread among its reference 
group. However, if favourable national norms are established, such as trust in 
political leadership and administration, voluntary tax compliance may be achieved. 
Furthermore, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2009), Bilgin (2010), Heinemann 
(2011), Strielkowski and Čábelkova (2015) and Ibrahim et al. (2015) show how 
national pride positively affects tax morale. In Table 1 we find political variables 
such as trust in justice system, government, parliament, the EU; evaluation of 
democracy, governance quality and national officers; and national pride. A higher 
trust in all of the above institutions acts positively on tax morale. 
Let us focus our attention on the contextual variables analysed in this article. 
The first vector of variables refers to the effect of tax burden on tax morale. A number 
of literature has analysed the influence of tax burden. Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 
(2010) found that tax morale is influenced negatively by tax burden both in level 
values and increases in the recent past. Furthermore, they test the existence of 
different effects of both direct and indirect taxes, yielding the same results. However, 
Kountouris and Remoundou (2013) analysed solely the influence of tax burden in 
level values and found no significant relation with tax morale. The only available 
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similar research is the one by Torgler et al. (2008) who explore the perceived tax 
burden. However, it is measured as individuals’ answer from a determined scale and 
not as actual data as in the first case. 
A second vector includes indexes on the extent of shadow economy. We expect 
that tax morale was stronger in those countries with low levels of shadow activities. 
A vice versa mutual effect of these variables has been explored in Torgler and 
Schneider (2009) who found an expected negative influence of higher tax morale on 
shadow economy. 
Finally, the last vector refers to the Index of Economic Freedom by the 
Heritage Foundation. It measures economic freedom based on trade freedom, 
business freedom, investment freedom and property rights. Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) 
confirmed the thesis that tax morale more conducive to tax compliance is highest in 
countries characterized by high economic freedom. Torgler and Schneider (2009) 
also use economic freedom as a proxy variable for government interventionism and 
Halla (2012) to measure governance quality. In both cases, authors find that shadow 
economy is negatively related to the degree of economic freedom. Hence, our 
hypothesis is that economic freedom boost tax morale.  
Literature on the determinants of tax morale in former Yugoslavian countries 
and tax morale is scarce. In some cases, individual countries can be found as parts of 
wider samples. Table 1 summarizes the most important characteristics, such as the 
survey used, the variables tested or the results, of the literature on the determinants 
of tax morale in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. However, when it comes to 
tax burden in former Yugoslavian countries the results of a negative tax gap in 
Khwaja and Iyer (2014) suggest that there is a load on taxpayers. More precisely, the 
tax administration might be collecting more than the taxpayers can afford given their 
economic situation. Thus creating an incentive to evade taxes. 
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Table 13: Tax morale literature concerning former Yugoslavian countries 
Authors Countries Survey Tested variables Results 
Torgler 
(2003b) 
BiH x 
WVS 
Wave 2 
1990-
1993 
age, gender, marital status, 
employment status, trust in 
legal system, income 
Tax morale: 
-increases with age; -is stronger with women; -
is stronger with married and widowed, weaker 
with living together, divorced, separated; -is 
weaker with self-employed, unemployed, 
student, other; -decreases with trust in legal 
system; -decreases with income 
Cro x 
Mac x 
Mne x 
Ser x 
Slo x 
Torgler 
(2004a) 
BiH x 
WVS 
Wave 3 
1995–
1997 
age, gender, marital status, 
employment status, trust in 
legal system, trust in 
government, trust in 
parliament, satisfaction 
with national officers, 
evaluation of the political 
system 
Tax morale: 
-increases with age; -is stronger with women; -
is stronger with married and widowed, weaker 
with living together; - weaker with self-
employed and at home,  stronger for retired; -
increases with trust in legal system; -increases 
with trust in government; -increases with trust 
in parliament; -increases with satisfaction with 
national officers; -increases with evaluation of 
the political system 
Cro x 
Mac x 
Mne x 
Ser x 
Slo x 
Torgler 
(2006) 
BiH x 
WVS 
Wave 3 
1995–
1997 
age, gender, educational 
level, marital status, 
employment status, 
financial satisfaction, 
social class, risk aversion, 
church attendance, 
religious education, 
activity in church group, 
religiosity, importance of 
religion, religious 
guidance, trust in church 
Tax morale: 
-increases with age; -is stronger with women; -
decreases with educational level; -is stronger 
with married, weaker with living together; -is 
stronger for part-time employed, at home and 
retired; -increases with financial satisfaction; -
is weaker with upper class, upper middle class 
and lower middle class; -increases with risk 
aversion; -increases with church attendance; -
increases with religious education; -increases 
with activity in church group; -increases with 
religiosity; -increases with importance of 
religion; -increases with religious guidance; -
increases with trust in church 
Cro  
Mac x 
Mne x 
Ser x 
Slo x 
Lago-
Peñas 
and 
Lago-
Peñas 
(2010) 
BiH  
ESS 
2004 
gender, age, educational 
level, religiosity, financial 
satisfaction, employment 
status, satisfaction with 
democracy, trust in 
politicians, ethnic–
linguistic fractionalization, 
regional GDPpc, federal, 
national tax burden, 
change in national tax 
burden, direct tax burden, 
change in direct tax 
burden, change in the rest 
of tax burden 
Tax morale: 
-is stronger with men; -increases with age; -
decreases with educational level; -increases 
with religiosity; -is stronger with finding it 
difficult, coping on present income and living 
comfortably; -is weaker for self-employed; -
increases with satisfaction with democracy; -
increases with trust in politicians; -decreases 
with ethnic–linguistic fractionalization; -is 
weaker in richer regions; -is weaker in federal 
than in unitary countries; -decreases with 
national tax burden; -decreases with change in 
national tax burden; -decreases with direct tax 
burden; -decreases with change in direct tax 
burden; -decreases with change in the rest of 
tax burden 
Cro  
Mac  
Mne  
Ser  
Slo x 
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Authors Countries Survey Tested variables Results 
Xin Li 
(2010) 
BiH x 
WVS 
Wave 
4 
1999-
2002 
ethnic majority, citizen 
identity, trust in government, 
gender, age, working class, 
marital status, educational 
level 
Tax morale: 
-is stronger with ethnic majorities; -is stronger with 
citizen identity; -increases with trust in 
government; -is stronger with women; -increases 
with age; -decreases with working class; -is 
stronger with married; -decreases with educational 
level 
Cro  
Mac x 
Mne  
Ser  
Slo  
Torgler 
(2011) 
BiH  
EVS 
2008 
age, gender, educational 
level, discuss politics, follow 
politics, marital status, risk 
aversion, religiosity, church 
attendance, employment 
status, trust in government, 
trust in justice system, trust 
in EU, governance quality 
Tax morale: 
-increases with age; -is stronger with women; -
decreases with educational level; -decreases with 
discussing politics; -increases with following 
politics; -is stronger with married; -increases with 
risk aversion; -increases with religiosity; -increases 
with church attendance; -is weaker for self-
employed; -increases with trust in government; -
increases with trust in justice system; -increases 
with trust in EU; -increases with governance 
quality 
Cro  
Mac  
Mne  
Ser  
Slo x 
Daude et al. 
(2013) 
BiH  
WVS 
Wave 
5 
2005-
2009 
religiosity, gender, age, 
educational level, 
employment status, trust in 
government, support for 
democracy, redistributive 
democracies 
Tax morale: 
-increases with religiosity; -is stronger with 
women; -increases with age; -increases with 
educational level; -is weaker for part-time 
employed, self-employed and unemployed, 
stronger for retired; -increases with trust in 
government; -increases with support for 
democracy; -is stronger in redistributive 
democracies 
Cro  
Mac  
Mne  
Ser x 
Slo x 
Kountouris 
and 
Remoundou 
(2013) 
BiH  
ESS 
2004 
years of education, 
employment status, marital 
status, household size, 
gender, age, attending 
religious services, average 
tax rate, GDPpc, 
unemployment rate 
Tax morale: 
-increases with years of education; -is weaker for 
self-employed and in paid work; -is stronger with 
married; -decreases with household size; -is 
stronger with women; -increases with age; -
increases with attending religious services; -
decreases with average tax rate; -is weaker in richer 
countries; -is weaker in countries with higher 
unemployment rate 
Cro  
Mac  
Mne  
Ser  
Slo x 
Ristovska 
et al. (2013) 
BiH  
EVS 
2008 
age, income, trust in 
government, trust in justice, 
trust in civil service, national 
pride, satisfaction in life 
Tax morale: 
-increases with age; income; trust in government; 
trust in justice; national pride; satisfaction in life; -
decreases with trust in civil service; 
Cro  
Mac x 
Mne  
Ser  
Slo  
Williams 
and 
Krasniqi 
(2017) 
BiH x 
LITS 
gender, age, marital status, 
employment status, 
household ownership, 
education, GDPpc, 
corruption index, legal rights 
index, tax revenue, health 
expenditures, expenditure per 
student 
Tax morale: 
-increases with age; legal rights index; tax revenue; 
health expenditures; expenditure per student; -is 
weaker with employed; self-employed; rented 
household; -is stronger with households under 
mortgage; -decreases with GDPpc; higher fighting 
corruption index; 
Cro x 
Mac x 
Mne x 
Ser x 
Slo x 
Notes: BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cro - Croatia, Mac - Macedonia, Mne - 
Montenegro, Ser - Serbia and Slo – Slovenia; WVS - World Values Survey, EVS - 
European Values Study, ESS - European Social Survey and LITS - Life in Transition 
Survey. 
Source: own elaboration 
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3.3. Methodology 
In the methodology section we presented the hypotheses to be contrasted, 
followed by the econometric specification and finally the database used. We classify 
the hypothesis to be tested into three groups. The first one refers to individual 
attributes (both status and personal beliefs). The second one deals with contextual 
variables affecting at country level. Finally, we also test three hypothesis on the 
interaction of some contextual and individual variables. 
3.3.1. Hypotheses 
Individuals’ attributes variables 
H1: Tax morale is influenced by individuals’ attributes variables of personal 
status: age, gender, marital status, education level, income level, employment status 
and religiosity as justified in the literature review above. 
H2: Tax morale is influenced by individuals’ attributes variables of personal 
beliefs: confidence in political parties, confidence in legal system, confidence in 
parliament, confidence in national government, discussing politics, national pride 
and justifying bribe as justified in the literature review above 
Contextual variables 
The hypotheses related to contextual variables are listed the following: 
H3: Tax morale is weakened by a larger and rising tax burden (total taxes, 
direct taxes, rest of taxes, change in total taxes, change in direct taxes or change in 
rest of taxes). 
H4: Tax morale is weakened by a larger shadow economy. 
H5: Tax morale is strengthened by higher values the index of economic 
freedom.  
In Table 2, we provide the expected signs for the hypotheses related to 
individuals’ attributes variables and contextual variables. 
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Table 14: H1 to H5 expected outcomes 
Personal status 
variables 
Expected 
sign: 
Found in: 
Age Positive 
Torgler (2003b), Torgler (2004a), Torgler (2006), Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010), 
Torgler (2011), Xin Li (2010), Daude et al. (2013), Kountouris and Remoundou (2013), 
Ristovska et al. (2013) and Williams and Krasniqi (2017). 
Gender   
female Positive 
Torgler (2003b), Torgler (2004a), Torgler (2006), Torgler (2011), Xin Li (2010), Daude 
et al. (2013) and Kountouris and Remoundou (2013). 
Marital status   
married Positive 
Torgler (2003b), Torgler (2004a), Torgler (2006), Torgler (2011), Xin Li (2010) and 
Kountouris and Remoundou (2013). 
living together Negative Torgler (2003b), Torgler (2004a) and Torgler (2006), 
divorced Negative Torgler (2003b) and Strielkowski and Čábelkova (2015) 
separated Negative Torgler (2003b) and Strielkowski and Čábelkova (2015) 
widowed Positive Torgler (2003b) and Torgler (2004a) 
single Negative Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2009) 
Education level Negative Torgler (2006) and Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) and Xin Li (2010) 
Income level Negative Torgler (2003b), Heinemann (2011) and Strielkowski and Čábelkova (2015) 
Employment   
full-time Negative Heinemann (2011), Williams and Krasniqi (2017). 
self-employed Negative 
Torgler (2003b), Torgler (2004a), Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010), Torgler (2011), 
Daude et al. (2013), Kountouris and Remoundou (2013), Williams and Krasniqi (2017). 
retired Positive Torgler (2004a), Torgler (2006) and Daude et al. (2013) 
at home Negative Torgler (2004a) and Ibrahim et al. (2015) 
student Negative Torgler (2003b) 
unemployed Negative Torgler (2003b), Daude et al. (2013) and Kountouris and Remoundou (2013). 
other 
employment 
Negative Torgler (2003b) 
Religiosity Positive 
Torgler (2006) and Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010), Torgler (2011) and Daude et al. 
(2013) 
Personal 
beliefs 
Expected 
sign: 
Found in: 
Confidence in 
political parties 
Positive Torgler (2004a) and Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010), 
Confidence in 
the legal system 
Positive Torgler (2003b), Torgler (2004a), Bilgin (2010) and Ristovska et al. (2013) 
Confidence in 
parliament 
Positive Torgler (2004a) and Heinemann (2011), 
Confidence in 
the national 
government 
Positive 
Torgler (2004a), Torgler (2011), Xin Li (2010), Daude et al. (2013), Ibrahim et al. (2015) 
and Ristovska et al. (2013) 
Discussing 
politics 
Negative Torgler (2011) 
National pride Positive 
Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2009), Bilgin (2010), Heinemann (2011), Ristovska et 
al. (2013), Strielkowski and Čábelkova (2015) and Ibrahim et al. (2015) 
Justifying bribe Negative Jahnke (2015a) 
Contextual 
variables 
Expected 
sign: 
Found in: 
Tax burden Negative Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) 
Change in tax 
burden 
Negative Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) 
Direct tax 
burden 
Negative Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) 
Rest of taxes Negative Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) 
Shadow 
economy 
Negative Torgler and Schneider (2009) 
Economic 
freedom 
Positive Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) 
Source: own elaboration 
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Interactions between contextual variables and personal beliefs 
By including the interactions, we aim to verify whether the effect of individual 
variables is different depending on the contextual variable they are interacting with. 
From an econometric point of view, besides identifying the direct effect of contextual 
variables as in the hypotheses H3-H5 we shall also identify the indirect effect through 
these interactions. 
Looking from a substantive perspective, we focus on the three interactions. 
First, we test whether the positive effect of national pride on tax morale is weakened 
by a larger tax burden (H6). Hypothesis H7 relates the rejection of bribe with shadow 
economy. Lastly, in H8, we test if the estimated negative effect of individual income 
on tax morale is softened when the degree of economic freedom is higher. In sum: 
H6: The influence of national pride on tax morale is weakened by a larger tax 
burden  
H7: The influence of justifying bribe on tax morale is weakened by larger 
shadow economy. 
H8: The influence of income level on tax morale is affected by the degree of 
economic freedom. 
3.3.2. Econometric specification 
In order to examine the hypotheses presented above, we estimate the following 
general specification: 
0 1 2 3 4 5* * * * *i i i i i i iTM PS PB TB SE EF               [5] 
where: 
TMi denotes the tax morale of an individual i; 
PSi are the variables from H1 that contains individuals’ personal status;  
PBi are the variables from H2 that contains individuals’ personal beliefs; 
TBi are the contextual variables from H3 concerning tax burden (total taxes, 
direct taxes and rest of taxes); 
SEi is the contextual variable from H4 concerning shadow economy; 
EFi is the contextual variable from H5 concerning the index of economic 
freedom; 
ε is the error term. 
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In equation [5], we replace the contextual variables by a set of country 
dummies (Di) that account for country fixed effects.37 Each country dummy would 
capture the net effect of contextual variables which are fixed within each country. 
As usual, in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity only 5 dummies are included. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the country of reference. Besides, we explore interactions 
between some of the previously used contextual variables and individual variables. 
This is captured in the interaction term CVi*PBi. 
38 These contextual variables within 
the interactions represent a moderator effect of the coefficient on the corresponding 
individual variable. 
0 1 2 3* * * * *i i i i i i iTM PS PB CV PB D             [6] 
 Seeing how our dependant variable is categorical and ordered, we perform a 
multinomial ordered logistic regression model. The estimates are made at individual 
level in both equations, yet in the second one we explore the country effect in our 
sample by including country dummy variables. Finally, in both [1] and [2], we 
assume homogeneity across the country sample. After performing an alternative 
estimate including the possibility of different country slopes for all variables, the 
increase in the pseudo R2 was marginal and cross-country differences in slopes 
scarcely relevant. 
In the analysis of tax morale following equation [5], we have estimated several 
models to inspect H3-H5 individually. H1 and H2 were tested in all models. In 
models (1) to (3) we have added the tax burden variables to inspect H3. We replace 
the tax burden variables with shadow economy and economic freedom in models (4) 
and (5), to test H4 and H5, respectively. Moreover, model (6) sums up all previously 
tested contextual variables from H3-H5. Finally, equation [6] is estimated in models 
(6), (7) and (8), where we add the country dummy variables instead of contextual 
ones and include interactions to test H6-H8, respectively. As in the previous case, 
model (9) synthesizes the three previous ones. All estimates were performed using 
the command ologit implemented in the statistical software package Stata 14. 39 
                                                 
37 Due to perfect multicollinearity, contextual variables and country dummies cannot be 
simultaneously included. 
38 This is not the first time such method is being applied in literature. For instance, Belmonte et al. 
(2017) combined the contextual variable “measure of decentralization” with individual aversion 
toward ethnic diversity; Xin Li (2010) combined the majority citizen group with 
ethnic/linguistic/religious fractionalization. Lastly, an example most similar to our analysis, Jahnke 
(2015a) used an interaction of individuals’ justification of bribe and a corruption index. 
39 Although we explored the option of using probit models instead, the outcomes of those estimates 
do not considerably differ from the logit ones. 
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3.3.3. Data 
We create the dataset used in our analysis from the European Values Study 
(EVS) 2008. The dependant variable is tax morale. The corresponding survey 
question ask individuals whether they approve cheating on taxes. The survey 
questions are presented as follows: “Please tell me for each of the following 
statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between: Cheating on tax if you have the chance. Answers on a ten-
point scale where 1= Can never be justified and 10= Can always be justified.” 
The dependent variable has been re-coded for the purpose of easier 
interpretation to a scale from 1 to 3, where 1 stands for “always justify cheating on 
tax morale” and 3 for “never justify cheating on tax morale”. Due to the specific 
distribution of answers (Figure 1), they have been recoded to present the individuals’ 
views the following way 1=3, 2-9=2 and 10=1. 
Figure 9: Mean of tax morale across former Yugoslavian countries 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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 gender - dummy variable that equals 1 for men and 0 for women. 
 married, living, divorced, separated, widowed and single – dummy variables 
with value 1 for corresponding status and 0 for other. 
 education - Highest educational level attained: pre-primary or none, primary 
level (first stage), primary level (second stage), secondary level, tertiary level 
and tertiary level (higher stages) 
 religion – Scale from 1 to 4 where 4 corresponds to “religion is very 
important in life” and 1 “not at all important”. 
Personal beliefs variables are operationalized as follows: 
 income - Subjective scale of annual household income from 1 to 12 in 2008. 
 fulltime, parttime, selfem, retired, athome, student, unemp and otheremp - 
dummy variables with value 1 for corresponding employment status(full-
time employed, part-time employed, self-employed, retired, at home, student, 
unemployed or other employment) and 0 for other 
 conpol, conjus, conparl and congov – Confidence on a scale from 1 to 4 
where 4 corresponds to “a great deal” and 1 to “none at all”, respectively for: 
political parties, the legal system, parliament and the national government. 
 discpol – Answer for “how often do you discuss political matters with 
friends?” on a scale from 1 to 3 where 3 corresponds to “frequently” and 1 to 
“never”. 
 pride - Answer for “how proud are you to be [nationality]?” on a scale from 
1 to 4 where 4 corresponds to “very proud” and 1 to “not at all proud”. 
 bribe - Answer for “do you justify accepting a bribe?” on a scale from 1 to 
10 where 10 corresponds to “never” and 1 to “always”. 
When it comes to contextual variables, due to limitations imposed by the 
degrees of freedom in the model, we use interactions of contextual variables with 
data from EVS 2008. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
name 
Variable description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Source 
Dependant variable 
tm 
Justifiable: Cheating on taxes if you 
have a chance 
8,769 2.68 0.52 1 10 EVS 2008 
Individuals’ attributes variables 
age Age 
8,898 44.63 17.1
6 
15 103 
EVS 2008 
gender Sex 8,931 0.46 0.50 0 1 EVS 2008 
mar Marital status 8,824 2.79 2.19 1 6 EVS 2008 
married Marital status: married 8,824 0.55 0.5 0 1 EVS 2008 
living Marital status: living together 8,824 0.02 0.14 0 1 EVS 2008 
divorced Marital status: divorced 8,824 0.04 0.2 0 1 EVS 2008 
separated Marital status: separated 8,824 0 0.07 0 1 EVS 2008 
widowed Marital status: widowed 8,824 0.1 0.3 0 1 EVS 2008 
single Marital status: single 8,824 0.29 0.45 0 1 EVS 2008 
education Highest educational level attained 8,844 2.81 0.95 0 5 EVS 2008 
religion Importance in life: Religion 8,752 2.89 0.9 1 4 EVS 2008 
relden Religious Denomination 6,651 4.98 3.2 1 9 EVS 2008 
catholic Religious Denomination: catholic 6,651 0.36 0.48 0 1 EVS 2008 
orthodox Religious Denomination: orthodox 6,651 0.48 0.5 0 1 EVS 2008 
muslim Religious Denomination: muslim 6,651 0.15 0.36 0 1 EVS 2008 
otherrel 
Religious Denomination: other 
religion 
6,651 0 0.07 0 1 EVS 2008 
nonrel 
Religious Denomination: non-
religious 
8,931 0.26 0.44 0 1 EVS 2008 
income Subjective scale of income 7,381 3.2 1.68 1 12 EVS 2008 
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics, Part 2/2 
Variable 
name 
Variable description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Source 
employ Employment status 8,801 4.2 2.87 1 10 EVS 2008 
fulltime 
Employment status: full-time 
employed 
8,801 0.38 0.49 0 1 EVS 2008 
parttime 
Employment status: part-time 
employed 
8,801 0.02 0.15 0 1 EVS 2008 
selfem Employment status: self-employed 8,801 0.04 0.2 0 1 EVS 2008 
retired Employment status: retired 8,801 0.21 0.41 0 1 EVS 2008 
athome Employment status: at home 8,801 0.05 0.22 0 1 EVS 2008 
student Employment status: student 8,801 0.08 0.27 0 1 EVS 2008 
unemp Employment status: unemployed 8,801 0.21 0.4 0 1 EVS 2008 
otheremp 
Employment status: other 
employment 
8,801 0.01 0.11 0 1 EVS 2008 
conpol Confidence: Political Parties 8,606 1.81 0.76 1 4 EVS 2008 
conjus Confidence: The legal system 8,683 2.19 0.85 1 4 EVS 2008 
conparl Confidence: Parliament 8,673 2.08 0.83 1 4 EVS 2008 
congov 
Confidence: The national 
government 
8,573 2.07 0.86 1 4 EVS 2008 
discpol Discuss political matters 8,823 1.77 0.63 1 3 EVS 2008 
pride 
How proud are you to be 
[nationality] 
8,410 3.23 0.83 1 4 EVS 2008 
bribe 
Justifiable: Someone accepting a 
bribe in the course their duties 
8,823 9.42 1.54 1 10 EVS 2008 
Contextual variables 
taxb tax burden (%GDP) 8,931 0.35 0.04 0.28 0.38 
IMF and corresponding 
Ministries of Finance data. 
dtaxb direct tax burden (%GDP) 8,931 0.17 0.03 0.13 0.22 
IMF and corresponding 
Ministries of Finance data. 
rest rest of tax |burden (%GDP) 8,931 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.14 
IMF and corresponding 
Ministries of Finance data. 
shadow shadow economy (%GDP) 8,931 0.19 0.23 -0.32 0.34 Mai and Schneider (2015).  
ecfr The Index of Economic Freedom 8,931 57.41 2.78 53.7 61.1 The Heritage Foundation 
Source: own elaboration 
The contextual variables are operationalized as follows: 
 taxb – Tax burden is total taxes (including social security contributions) 
expressed as a percentage of GDP 
 dtaxb – Direct tax burden are personal income tax, corporate income tax and 
social security contributions expressed as a percentage of GDP 
 rest – Indirect tax burden are the rest of taxes when direct are taken from total 
taxes (VAT, customs, excise and other taxes) 
 change_taxb – Change in tax burden 2006 to 2008  
 shadow – Shadow economy expressed as a percentage of GDP 
 ecfr - The Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation. The 
observations are from 2008, except for Serbia and Montenegro, which are 
from 2009 since it was the first year the index was recorded. 
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In Table 3 we report simple correlations between contextual variables in order to 
make initial checks to avoid multicollinearity. Table 4 does the same for interactions. 
Table 16: Correlation between contextual variables 
 taxb dtaxb rest 
change_ 
taxb shadow ecfr 
taxb 1      
dtaxb 0.58 1     
rest 0.65 -0.25 1    
change_ 
taxb -0.15 -0.38 0.19 1   
shadow -0.26 0.31 -0.59 0.51 1  
ecfr -0.50 0.096 -0.68 0.22 0.63 1 
Source: own elaboration 
Table 17: Correlation between interactions of contextual variables 
 pride_taxb shadow_bribe income_ecfr 
pride_taxb 1   
shadow_bribe 0.08 1  
income_ecfr 0.12 0.15 1 
Source: own elaboration 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Estimates 
The main results of equation [5] are displayed in Table 5. When looking at 
individual level variables, most of the variables commonly used in literature result 
in expected signs and are statistically significant. Concerning personal status 
variables, tax morale is positively related to age, females, education and religion, 
while it is negatively connected with income. We emphasize the positive impact of 
education on tax morale, where individuals with higher education should have higher 
tax morale. Although in literature there were more findings of an opposite outcome, 
we rely on supporting the arguments found in Torgler (2012) who explored Eastern 
European countries, a sample more similar to ours than other literature. Furthermore, 
marital status and employment status variables prove to have no influence over tax 
morale with the sole exception of part time employed individuals. As for personal 
beliefs variables, confidence in institutions such as the government, parliament, 
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justice and political parties has no effect on tax morale. Nonetheless, national pride 
and not justifying bribe appear to positively correlate to tax morale. 
The second part of Table 5 shows the link between country’s tax burden, 
shadow economy and economic freedom with tax morale. First, the coefficient on 
both overall tax burden and change in overall tax burden is significant and negative. 
Just the same, the coefficient on direct tax burden is equally significant and negative, 
while the rest of taxes (indirect ones) do not play any role40. Second, the appearance 
of shadow economy41, similarly to tax burden, also has a statistically significant 
negative impact on tax morale. Lastly, the index of economic freedom also plays a 
role concerning tax morale: by having more economic freedom in a country, an 
individuals’ tax morale is likely to rise. Furthermore, all of these effects maintain 
their aspect when merged in a final estimate. The contextual variables are all 
significant at the 0.01 or 0.05 level. 
  
                                                 
40 We also ran model (2), alternatively testing direct tax burden and change in direct tax burden; as 
well as rest of taxes and change in rest of taxes. The results for these variables both hold similarly as 
in models 2 and 3. 
41 Although we considered including the estimates of tax evasion in model 4, we finally opted for 
shadow economy. Tax evasion estimates in Crnogorac and Lago-Peñas (2018) are based on shadow 
economy and the latter grasps a larger scope of activities. Hence, the inclusion of both is redundant. 
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Table 18: Estimates of equation [5] 
 Tax burden 
contextuals 
Tax burden 
contextuals 
Tax burden 
contextuals 
Shadow 
activity  
Economic 
freedom  
H3-H5 Joint 
final estimate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
age 0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
gender -0.17 
(0.07)** 
-0.17 
(0.07)** 
-0.18 
(0.07)** 
-0.15 
(0.07)** 
-0.17 
(0.07)** 
-0.19 
(0.07)** 
living -0.14 
(0.22) 
-0.16 
(0.22) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
-0.12 
(0.22) 
-0.22 
(0.22) 
-0.29 
(0.23) 
divorced -0.18 
(0.16) 
-0.18 
(0.16) 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
-0.2 
(0.16) 
-0.22 
(0.16) 
-0.17 
(0.16) 
separated 0.72 
(0.67) 
0.73 
(0.67) 
0.71 
(0.68) 
0.7 
(0.68) 
0.73 
(0.68) 
0.8 
(0.69) 
widowed -0.14 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.12 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.1 
(0.13) 
single -0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.14 
(0.09) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
education 0.14 
(0.04)*** 
0.15 
(0.04)*** 
0.08 
(0.04)* 
0.16 
(0.04)*** 
0.15 
(0.04)*** 
0.15 
(0.04)*** 
religion 0.08 
(0.04)** 
0.08 
(0.04)** 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.04)** 
0.09 
(0.04)** 
0.09 
(0.04)** 
income -0.17 
(0.02)*** 
-0.18 
(0.02)*** 
-0.09 
(0.02)*** 
-0.17 
(0.02)*** 
-0.18 
(0.02)*** 
-0.17 
(0.02)*** 
parttime -0.38 
(0.2)* 
-0.39 
(0.2)* 
-0.38 
(0.2)* 
-0.4 
(0.2)** 
-0.37 
(0.2)* 
-0.36 
(0.2)* 
selfem -0.14 
(0.15) 
-0.13 
(0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.14 
(0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.11 
(0.15) 
retired 0.04 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.09 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.07 
(0.12) 
athome 0.11 
(0.17) 
0.1 
(0.17) 
0.07 
(0.17) 
0.08 
(0.17) 
0.13 
(0.17) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
student -0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.18 
(0.13) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.15 
(0.13) 
-0.15 
(0.13) 
-0.19 
(0.13) 
unemp -0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
otheremp -0.14 
(0.28) 
-0.15 
(0.28) 
-0.01 
(0.28) 
-0.11 
(0.28) 
-0.16 
(0.28) 
-0.19 
(0.28) 
conpol 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.06)* 
0.09 
(0.06)* 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
conjus -0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.05)* 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
conparl 0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
congov 0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.1 
(0.05)* 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
discpol 0.03 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0 
(0.05) 
pride 0.2 
(0.04)*** 
0.2 
(0.04)*** 
0.26 
(0.04)*** 
0.24 
(0.04)*** 
0.19 
(0.04)*** 
0.24 
(0.04)*** 
bribe 0.58 
(0.02)*** 
0.58 
(0.02)*** 
0.58 
(0.02)*** 
0.57 
(0.02)*** 
0.57 
(0.02)*** 
0.58 
(0.02)*** 
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Table 18: Estimates of equation [5], Part 2/2 
 Tax burden 
contextuals 
Tax burden 
contextuals 
Tax burden 
contextuals 
Shadow 
activity  
Economic 
freedom  
H3-H5 Joint 
final estimate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Taxb -3.58 
(0.93)*** 
-3.76 
(0.94)***  
 
 
-2.23 
(1.07)** 
change_ 
taxb 
 -1.69 
(0.94)*  
 
  
Dtaxb  
 
-10.89 
(1.39)*** 
 
  
rest  
 
1.7 
(1.21) 
 
  
Shadow  
  
-0.6 
(0.15)***  
-1.38 
(0.18)*** 
ecfr     0.04 
(0.01)*** 
0.1 
(0.02)*** 
/cut1 1.22 
(0.47)*** 
1.17 
(0.47)*** 
1.13 
(0.47)*** 
2.57 
(0.33)*** 
4.76 
(0.72)*** 
7.16 
(1.17)*** 
/cut2 4.55 
(0.48)*** 
4.51 
(0.48)*** 
4.47 
(0.48)*** 
5.91 
(0.34)*** 
8.09 
(0.73)*** 
10.52 
(1.18)*** 
No. of 
obs. 
6,148 6,148 6,148 6,148 6,148 6,148 
Pseudo 
R2 
0.151 0.157 0.157 0.151 0.151 0.159 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Source: own elaboration 
Concerning results of individual variables alone in Table 6, we find the same 
results as in Table 5, with an exception concerning personal status variables of 
education, religion and income42. Firstly, national pride has a positive effect on tax 
morale. However, when tax burden interacts with national pride, we discover the 
effect of patriotism fades when tax burden increase. Secondly, the same effect is 
found for bribe and shadow. Shadow economy tends to reduce the positive effect of 
variable bribe and tax morale. A higher shadow economy undermine also tax morale 
of individuals more intolerant of corruption. Lastly, we find that the higher the 
economic freedom in a country is, the negative effect of individual income on tax 
morale tends to drop. In the joint estimate, all previously mentioned results are 
confirmed. 
  
                                                 
42 A direct explanation for this was found in a robustness analysis conducted afterwards, where we 
discovered that by including a dummy variable solely for Slovenia the results hold for all contextual 
and individual level variables (except religion). The alternative estimate can be found in Appendix 6.  
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Table 19: Estimates of equation [6] 
 Tax burden 
variables 
Shadow 
activity 
variables 
Economic 
freedom  
H6-H8 Joint 
final 
estimate 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
age 0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
gender -0.21 
(0.07)*** 
-0.22 
(0.07)*** 
-0.22 
(0.07)*** 
-0.22 
(0.07)*** 
living 0.01 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
-0.03 
(0.23) 
-0.03 
(0.23) 
divorced -0.12 
(0.16) 
-0.12 
(0.16) 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
-0.12 
(0.16) 
separated 0.76 
(0.7) 
0.74 
(0.7) 
0.82 
(0.71) 
0.82 
(0.7) 
widowed -0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
-0.08 
(0.13) 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
single -0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
education 0.05 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
religion 0.04 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
income -0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03)   
parttime -0.35 
(0.2)* 
-0.35 
(0.2)* 
-0.32 
(0.2) 
-0.32 
(0.2) 
selfem -0.23 
(0.15) 
-0.25 
(0.15) 
-0.25 
(0.15) 
-0.25 
(0.15) 
retired 0.11 
(0.12) 
0.1 
(0.12) 
0.1 
(0.12) 
0.1 
(0.12) 
athome 0.03 
(0.17) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
0 
(0.17) 
student -0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
-0.19 
(0.13) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
unemp -0.14 
(0.09) 
-0.15 
(0.09)* 
-0.16 
(0.09)* 
-0.16 
(0.09)* 
otheremp -0.02 
(0.28) 
-0.04 
(0.28) 
-0.03 
(0.28) 
-0.04 
(0.28) 
conpol 0.09 
(0.06) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
conjus -0.09 
(0.05)* 
-0.09 
(0.05)* 
-0.09 
(0.05)* 
-0.09 
(0.05)* 
conparl 0.03 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
congov 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
discpol -0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
pride 
 
0.27 
(0.04)*** 
0.28 
(0.04)***  
bribe 0.58 
(0.02)***  
0.58 
(0.02)***  
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Table 19: Estimates of equation [6], Part 2/2 
 Tax burden 
variables 
Shadow 
activity 
variables 
Economic 
freedom  
H6-H8 Joint 
final 
estimate 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
croatia -1.38 
(0.14)*** 
-0.16 
(0.47) 
-1.13 
(0.12)*** 
-0.25 
(0.47) 
macedonia -0.61 
(0.33)* 
1.3 
(0.51)** 
-0.34 
(0.19)* 
0.03 
(0.6) 
montenegro -0.4 
(0.12)*** 
0.68 
(0.53) 
-0.82 
(0.15)*** 
0.51 
(0.54) 
serbia -0.27 
(0.12)** 
0.69 
(0.5) 
-0.6 
(0.13)*** 
0.69 
(0.51) 
slovenia -1.15 
(0.15)*** 
-0.13 
(0.48) 
-1.97 
(0.27)*** 
-0.87 
(0.53) 
pride 1.26 
(0.38)***   
1.27 
(0.37)*** 
pride_taxb -2.79 
(1.06)**   
-2.84 
(1.06)** 
bribe 
 
0.62 
(0.03)*** 
 0.62 
(0.03)*** 
shadow_bribe  -0.19 
(0.09)** 
 -0.21 
(0.09)** 
income   -1.67 
(0.45)*** 
-1.66 
(0.45)*** 
income_ecfr   0.03 
(0.01)*** 
0.03 
(0.01)*** 
/cut1 2.11 
(0.34)*** 
3.16 
(0.52)*** 
1.95 
(0.35)*** 
2.73 
(0.53)*** 
/cut2 5.49 
(0.36)*** 
6.53 
(0.53)*** 
5.33 
(0.36)*** 
6.11 
(0.54)*** 
No. of obs. 6,148 6,148 6,148 6.148 
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.171 0.172 0.173 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Source: own elaboration 
3.4.2. Discussion 
The previous result subsection has confirmed the findings from existing 
literature on the effects of the individual level variables. With increasing age, survey 
respondents are more likely to show a higher tax morale. Women tend to be more 
disciplined when it comes to taxes than men. Also, a link is confirmed between those 
with higher education and those having a higher tax morale. This confirms the 
argument about an educated taxpayer also being a responsible one. Moreover, the 
results are in line with the previously mentioned arguments that religious individuals 
and those with national pride are to exhibit more tax morale. Hence, we could 
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probably intuitively argue that this is due to understanding taxpaying as a 
contribution to general public good. Nevertheless, the results also showed tax morale 
is weaker with those having a higher income level. That is, the higher the individual 
income level of a respondent in a country is, the lower is her/his willingness to pay 
taxes. The personal beliefs variable on confidence in parliament shows it has 
beneficial effects on tax morale if the individuals have trust in the country’s 
parliament. Lastly, the impact of not justifying bribe confirms how individuals 
distant to corruption are to have more tax compliance. 
The arguments for contextual variables were confirmed in both tables 5 and 6. 
Both the level and recent change in the overall tax burden are negatively correlated 
with tax morale. This proves to show how a fiscal overburden may produce a 
counterproductive effect with individuals when it comes to collecting taxes (“tax 
fatigue”). This effect is principally supported by the results on more visible direct 
taxes.  
The results on shadow activities also support the importance of having a non-
corrupt environment in order to sustain tax compliance within in a country. A higher 
percentage of shadow economy will negatively influence tax morale. In addition, a 
higher shadow economy is shown to negatively affect tax morale with corruption 
averse individuals. 
Finally, the last hypothesis on economic freedom is confirmed by the results 
that having more economic liberties in a country embodied in trade freedom, 
business freedom, investment freedom and property rights will further encourage 
paying taxes with its citizens. This is also confirmed with individuals of higher 
income whose attitude towards paying taxes is transformed into a positive one by a 
higher degree of economic freedom in a country. 
3.5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have primarily intended to identify all relevant determinants 
of tax morale in former Yugoslavian countries. To do so, we have employed the 
survey database of the European Values Study. The statistical model we performed 
was an ordered logit, which helped us explore both individual and contextual level 
variables. Besides this, we included an estimate of interactions of the former two in 
order to verify whether the influence of individuals’ inherent attributes or the 
surroundings prevail in their attitude towards paying taxes. 
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Firstly, we establish how tax morale is shaped by both personal status and 
personal belief variables. In particular, personal status variables such as age, females, 
education and religion are positively related to tax morale. On the contrary, is 
negatively related to income. Regarding personal beliefs, patriotism and attitudes 
towards not justifying bribe appear to strengthen individual’s tax morale. 
Secondly, we prove that several contextual variables are of particular 
significance towards understanding the motivation of individual to paying taxes. An 
increased tax burden, and direct tax burden especially, show to have a negative 
influence on tax morale. Shadow economy also proved to be significant in the same 
sense. However, a higher extent of economic freedom established itself as a positive 
catalyst for fiscal discipline. 
Third and finally, by including interactions we showed how an environment 
can also modify the attitudes of individuals that later have an influence of tax morale. 
In this sense, an increased tax burden vanishes the positive effect of national pride 
on tax morale. Similarly, the positive effect of not justifying bribe on tax morale is 
turned undermined in the case of a higher shadow economy. Ultimately, the negative 
effect of individual income on tax morale is converted into a positive one when there 
is higher economic freedom. These findings show how, aside from their personal 
qualities, both fiscal and non-fiscal parameters can influence an individual’s decision 
whether to cheat on taxes. 
Everything considered, our results provide an insight into the key factors that 
motivate the tax compliance of citizens of former Yugoslavian countries at the time 
the survey was conducted. Hopefully the data released in the near future will contain 
homogeneous questions and enable us an analysis of changes in tax morale 
determinants over time for former Yugoslavian countries. In that case, the results 
presented in this paper will provide a solid standpoint for taking further research 
steps once there is new data available. 
  
74 
 
  
References 
     75 
References 
Agger R. E., Goldstein M. N. & Pearl S. A. (1961). Political cynicism: 
Measurement and meaning. The Journal of Politics, 23(3), 477-506. 
Alm J. (2012). Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion. Lessons from 
theory, experiments, and field studies: Working Papers 1213, Tulane University, 
Department of Economics 
Altar M., Necula C. and Bobeica G. (2010). Estimating the cyclically adjusted 
budget balance for the Romanian economy. A robust approach. Romanian Journal 
for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, 0(2), 79-99. 
Andreoni J., Erard B. & Feinstein, J. (1998). Tax compliance. Journal of 
economic literature, 36(2), 818-860. 
Aničić J., Laketa M., Radovic B., Radovic Dr. & Laketa L. (2012). Tax policy of 
Serbia in the function of developing the economic system. UTMS Journal of 
Economics, University of Tourism and Management, Skopje, Macedonia, 3(1), 33-
43 
Antic D. (2013). Multi-level fiscal system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Evolution 
and coping with economic crisis: Financial Theory and Practice, Institute of Public 
Finance, 37(3), 279-310 
Antic D. (2014). Efficiency of a single-rate and broad-based vat system. The case 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Financial theory and Practice, institute of Public 
Finance, 38(3), 303-335 
Arsić, M. & Krstić, G. (2015). Effects of formalisation of the shadow economy. 
Formalizing the Shadow Economy in Serbia, Springer international Publishing, 101-
107 
Atkinson A. B., Piketty T, & Saez E. (2011). Top incomes in the long run of 
history. Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, 49(1), 3-
71 
Barbone L, Belkindas V. M., Bettendorf L., Bird R., Bonch-Osmolovskiy M. & 
Smart M. (2013). Study to quantify and analyse the vat gap in the EU-27 member 
states. CASE Network Reports 0116, CASE-Center for Social and Economic 
Research 
Barić M. & Williams C.C. (2013). Tackling the undeclared economy in Croatia. 
South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics, Association of Economic Universities 
of South and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region, 11(1), 7-36 
76 
Barone G. & Mocetti S. (2011). Tax morale and public spending inefficiency. 
International Tax and Public Finance, 18(6), 724-749 
Beck N. and Katz J. (1995). What to do (and not to do) with times-series–cross-
section data in comparative politics. The American Political Science Review, 89(3), 
634-637. 
Bejaković P. (2009). Tax evasion, state capacity and trust in transitional countries. 
The case of Croatia: Društvena istraživanja: časopis za opća društvena pitanja, 18(4-
5 (102-103)), 787-805 
Bejaković P. (2015). A revision of the shadow economy in Croatia. Causes and 
effects: Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 28(1), 422-440 
Belmonte A., Dell'Anno R. & Teobaldelli D. (2017). Tax morale, aversion to 
ethnic diversity, and decentralization. European Journal of Political Economy. 
Beynet P. & Leibfritz W. (2009). Keeping Slovenian public finances on a 
sustainable path. OECD Economics Department Working Papers 734, OECD 
Publishing 
Bilgin C. (2014). Determinants of tax morale in Spain and Turkey: an empirical 
analysis. European Journal of Government and Economics, Europa Grande 3(1), 
June, 60-74 
Blaufus K., Braune M., Hundsdoerfer J. & Jacob M. (2015). Self-serving bias and 
tax morale. Economics Letters, Elsevier 131(C), 91-93 
Bouthevillain C, Cour-Thimann P., van de Dool G.,  Hernández de Cos P., 
Langenus G., Mohr M., Momigliano S. and Tujula M. (2001). Cyclically adjusted 
budget balances: An alternative approach. Working Paper Series 0077, European 
Central Bank. 
Božović S. (2016). Affirmation of the legal status of taxpayers in Montenegro. 
Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, 5(3), 
121-138 
Braithwaite V. & Ahmed E. (2005). A threat to tax morale: The case of Australian 
higher education policy. Journal of Economic Psychology, 26(4), 523-540. 
Bratic V. & Urban I. (2006). Tax expenditures in Croatia. Financial theory and 
Practice, institute of Public Finance, 30(2), 129-195 
Bratic V. (2012). (In)efficiency of corporate income tax expenditures on 
underdeveloped areas of special tax treatment in Croatia. Financial theory and 
Practice, institute of Public Finance, 36(4), 373-394 
References 
     77 
Brueckner J. K. (2000). Fiscal decentralization in developing countries. The 
effects of local corruption and tax evasion: Annals of Economics and Finance, 
Society for AEF, 1(1), 1-18 
Christie E. & Holzner M. (2006). What explains tax evasion? An empirical 
assessment based on European data. wiiw Working Papers 40, The Vienna Institute 
for International Economic Studies, wiiw 
Cindori S. (2015). Value added tax and its place in the fiscal system of the 
republic of Croatia during the financial crisis. Proceedings of international Academic 
Conferences 1003086, international institute of Social and Economic Sciences 
Crnogorac M. & Lago-Peñas S. (2018). Tax evasion in Former Yugoslavian 
countries. Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and 
decentralization 1811, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics 
research Network 
Culiberg, B. & Bajde D. (2014). Do you need a receipt?. Exploring consumer 
participation in consumption tax evasion as an ethical dilemma: Journal of business 
ethics : JOBE, 124(2) 
Cummings G.R., Martinez-Vazquez J. McKee M. & Torgler B. (2005). Effects of 
Tax Morale on Tax Compliance: Experimental and Survey Evidence (2005). 
International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU 
paper0516, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies, Georgia State University 
Daude C., Gutierrez H. & Melguizo A. (2013). What drives tax morale? A focus 
on emerging economies. Hacienda Pública Española, IEF 207(4), 9-40 
de Castro Fernández F., Basterrechea J. F. M., Montesinos A., García J. J. P. and 
Fuentes A. J. S. (2018). A quarterly fiscal database fit for macroeconomic analysis. 
Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, 224, 139-155. 
Diamond J. and Last D. (2003). Budget system reform in transitional economies 
- the case of the former yugoslav republics. IMF Working Papers, 03/247, 
International Monetary Fund. 
Doerrenberg P. & Peichl A. (2013). Progressive taxation and tax morale. Public 
Choice, Springer 155(3), 293-316 
Doerrenberg P., Duncan D., Fuest C. & Peichl A. (2012). Nice guys finish last: 
Are people with higher tax morale taxed more heavily?. CESifo Working Paper 
Series 3858, CESifo Group Munich 
Eilat Y. & Zinnes C. (2002). The shadow economy in transition countries. Friend 
or foe? A policy perspective: World Development, Elsevier, 30(7), 1233-1254 
78 
Feld L. P. & Frey B. S. (2007). Tax compliance as the result of a psychological 
tax contract: The role of incentives and responsive regulation. Law & Policy, 29(1), 
102-120. 
Filipović M. & Bunčić S. (2013). New countries and new economies in the 
Balkans. Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, 0(3), 281-315. 
Filippin A., Fiorio C. V. & Viviano E (2013). The effect of tax enforcement on 
tax morale. European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier 32(C), 320-331 
Fincke B. and Wolski M. (2016). Are European fiscal rules that bad? 
Discretionary fiscal policies in New Member States. Empirical Economics, 51(2), 
517-546. 
Fiscalis Tax Gap Project Group (2016). The concept of tax gaps - report on VAT 
gap estimations. Taxation Studies 0065, Directorate General Taxation and Customs 
Union, European Commission 
Frey B. & Torgler B. (2007). Tax morale and conditional cooperation. Journal of 
Comparative Economics 35(1), 136-159 
Gadzo S. & Klemenčić I. (2014). Time to stop avoiding the tax avoidance issue 
in Croatia? A proposal based on recent developments in the European Union. 
Financial theory and Practice, institute of Public Finance, 38(3), 277-302 
Gebauer A., Woon Nam C. & Parsche R. (2003). Is the completion of EU single 
market hindered by vat evasion?. CESifo Working Paper Series 974, CESifo Group 
Munich 
Gerstenbluth M., Melgar N., Pagano J.P., & Rossi M (2012). How do inequality 
affect tax morale in Latin America and Caribbean?. Revista de Economia del Rosario 
15(2), 123-135 
Girouard N. and André C. (2005). Measuring cyclically-adjusted budget balances 
for OECD countries. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 434, OECD 
Publishing. 
Godfrey L. G. (1978). Testing against general autoregressive and moving average 
error models when the regressors include lagged dependent variables. Econometrica, 
46(6), 1293-1301. 
Government finance statistics manual 2014. (2014). Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Grabowski, M. H. (2005). Reforms of tax systems in transition countries. 
Transition Studies Review, 12(2), 293-312. 
References 
     79 
Grdović Gnip A. (2015). Empirical assessment of stabilization effects of fiscal 
policy in Croatia. Romanian Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for 
Economic Forecasting, 0(1), 47-69. 
Halla M. (2012). Tax morale and compliance behaviour: first evidence on a causal 
link. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, 12(1), 1-27  
Heinemann F. (2011). Economic crisis and morale. European Journal of Law and 
Economics, Springer 32(1), 35-49 
Hodrick, R.J. and Prescott, E.C. (1997). Postwar U.S. business cycles: An 
empirical investigation. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 29, 1–16. 
Horodnic, I. & Williams, C.C. (2016). An evaluation of the shadow economy in 
Baltic states: a tax morale perspective. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and 
Small Business, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd 28(2/3), 339-358 
Ibrahim M, Musah A. & Abdul-Hanan A. (2015). Beyond enforcement: what 
drives tax morale in Ghana?. Humanomics: The International Journal of Systems and 
Ethics, Emerald Group Publishing 31(4), 399-414 
International Monetary Fund (2015). Republic of Croatia; staff report for the 2015 
article iv consultation. IMF Staff Country Reports 15/163, International Monetary 
Fund 
International Monetary Fund (2015a). Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 
fourth post-program monitoring discussions. IMF Staff Country Reports 15/18, 
International Monetary Fund 
Jahnke B. (2015). Tax morale and reciprocity. A case study from Vietnam. 
Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-563, Leibniz Universität Hannover, 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 
Jahnke B. (2015a). How does petty corruption affect tax morale in sub-Saharan 
Africa? An empirical analysis. Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) 564  
Jemec N., Strojan Kastelec A. and Delakorda A. (2013). How do fiscal shocks 
affect the macroeconomic dynamics in the Slovenian economy. Bank of Slovenia 
Working Papers 1/2013. 
Kabashi R. (2014). The cyclical character of fiscal policy in transition countries. 
Focus on European economic integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian 
Central Bank), 1, 57-73. 
Khwaja M. S. & Iyer I. (2014). Revenue potential, tax space, and tax gap: a 
comparative analysis. Policy Research Working Paper 6868 
80 
Kirchler E. (1999). Reactance to taxation: Employers' attitudes towards taxes. 
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-
Economics) 28(2), 131-138 
Kirchler E., Hoelzl E. & Wahl I. (2008). Enforced versus voluntary tax 
compliance: The “slippery slope” framework. Journal of Economic Psychology, 
29(2), 210-225. 
Kiviet, J.F. (1995). On bias, inconsistency and efficiency of various estimators in 
dynamic panel data models.  Journal of Econometrics 68, 53-78. 
Koczan Z. (2015). Fiscal deficit and public debt in the western Balkans: 15 years 
of economic transition. IMF Working Papers, 15/172, International Monetary Fund. 
Koczan Z. (2015). Fiscal deficit and public debt in the Western Balkans; 15 years 
of economic transition. IMF Working Papers 15/172, International Monetary Fund 
Koczan Z. (2016). Fiscal policy, business cycles and discretion: evidence from 
the Western Balkans, Post-Communist Economies 28(4), 468–486. 
Kouamé W. A. (2015). Tax morale and trust in public institutions. Cahiers de 
recherche 15-14, Departement d'Economique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de 
Sherbrooke 
Kountouris Y. & Remoundou K. (2013). Is there a cultural component in tax 
morale? Evidence from immigrants in Europe. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, Elsevier 96(C), 104-119 
Lago-Peñas I. & Lago-Peñas S. (2010). The determinants of tax morale in 
comparative perspective: Evidence from European countries. European Journal of 
Political Economy, Elsevier 26(4), 441-453 
Lamotte O. (2012). Disentangling the impact of wars and sanctions on 
international trade: Evidence from former Yugoslavia. Comparative Economic 
Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, 54(3), 553-579. 
Lazović-Pita L. & Štambuk A. (2015). Professional opinions and attitudes on tax 
policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a special focus on the federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. South East European Journal of Economics and Business, De 
Gruyter Open, 10(2), 29-44 
Lewis A. (1982). The social psychology of taxation. British Journal of Social 
Psychology 21(2), 151-158 
Lubian D. & Zarri L. (2011). Happiness and tax morale: An empirical analysis. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier 80(1), 223-243 
References 
     81 
Maddison Project Database, version 2013. Bolt J. & van Zanden J. L.  (2014). 
The Maddison Project: collaborative research on historical national accounts. The 
Economic History Review 67 (3), 627–651. 
Madzarevic-Sujster S. (2002). An estimate of tax evasion in Croatia. Occasional 
paper series 13, Institute of Public Finance 
Mai H. & Schneider F. (2016). Size and development of the shadow economies 
of 157 countries worldwide. Updated and new measures from 1999 to 2013: IZA 
Discussion Papers 10281, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 
Mai H. and Schneider F. (2016). Size and development of the shadow economies 
of 157 countries worldwide: updated and new measures from 1999 to 2013. IZA 
Discussion Papers 10281, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 
Majcen B., Verbic M. & Cok M (2007). The income tax reform in Slovenia. 
Should the flat tax have prevailed? MPRA Paper 10348, University Library of 
Munich, Germany 
María-Dolores R., Alarcón G., & Garre M. (2010). Tax morale in Spain: A study 
into some of its principal determinants. Journal of Economic Issues, 44(4), 855-876 
Martinez-Vazquez J. & McNab R. (2000). Tax reform in the tax reform 
experiment in transitional countries. International Center for Public Policy Working 
Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0001, International Center for Public Policy, 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University 
Martinez-Vazquez J. & Torgler B. (2009). The evolution of tax morale in modern 
Spain. Journal of Economic Issues 43(1) 
Martinez-Vazquez, J., & McNab, R. (2000). Tax reform experiment in 
transitional countries. National Tax Journal, 53(2), 273-298. 
Mattina T. and Gunnarsson V. (2007). Budget rigidity and expenditure efficiency 
in Slovenia. IMF Working Papers 07/131, International Monetary Fund. 
Mazllami J.and Osmani R. (2014.). The impact of the fiscal decentralization 
process in the local public finance of the Western Balkan countries: A comparative 
analysis. Economy & Business Journal, International Scientific Publications, 
Bulgaria, 8(1), 730-741. 
McGee R.W., Basic M. & Tyler M. (2009). Tax evasion in Bosnia. Journal of 
Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11(2) 
Medina L. & Schneider F. (2017).Shadow economies around the world. New 
results for 158 countries over 1991-2015: CESifo Working Paper Series 6430, 
CESifo Group Munich 
82 
Mickiewicz T., Rebmann A. & Sauka A. (2017).  To pay or not to pay? Business 
owners’ tax morale: testing a neo-institutional framework in a transition 
environment. Journal of Business Ethics 1573-0697 
Mikulić D. & Galić Nagyszombaty A. (2013). Causes of the unofficial economy 
in new EU member states. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 26(1) 
Möhlmann A. (2014). Persistence or convergence? The east-west tax-morale gap 
in Germany. FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 
70(1), 3-30 
Möhring K. (2012). The fixed-effects as an alternative to multilevel analysis for 
cross-national analyses. GK Soclife, WorNing paper, (16) 
Molero J. & Pujol F. (2012). Walking inside the potential tax evader’s mind: Tax 
morale does matter. Journal of Business Ethics, Springer 105(2), 151-162 
Mourre G., Astarita C. & Princen S. (2014). Adjusting the budget balance for the 
business cycle. The EU methodology: European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 
- 2015 536, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), 
European Commission. 
Mourre G., Astarita C. and Princen S. (2014). Adjusting the budget balance for 
the business cycle: the EU methodology. European Economy - Economic Papers 
2008 - 2015 536, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), 
European Commission. 
Murphy, R. (2011). The Cost of Tax Abuse. A Briefing Paper on the Cost of Tax 
Evasion Worldwide. Tax Justice Network, Chesham 
Nenovski T. (2012). Macroeconomic aspects of the grey economy - the case of 
Macedonia. MPRA Paper 42253, University Library of Munich, Germany 
Nickell, S. J. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica, 
Econometric Society, 49(6), 1417-1426. 
Ott K (2004). The evolution of the informal economy and tax evasion in Croatia. 
Taxation eJournal of Tax ResearchATAX, University of New South Wales 
Pesaran, M.H. (2004). General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in 
panels. Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0435, Faculty of Economics, 
University of Cambridge. 
Poniatowski G., Bonch-Osmolovskiy M. & Belkindas M. (2016). Study to 
quantify and analyse the VAT gap in the EU member states. 2016 final report: CASE 
Network Studies and Analyses 0483, CASE-Center for Social and Economic 
Research. 
References 
     83 
Prebble R. (2005). Does Croatia need a general anti-avoidance rule? 
Recommended changes to Croatia's current legislative framework. Financial theory 
and Practice, institute of Public Finance, 29(3), 211-227 
Primorac M. (2014). The restructuring of the fiscal equalization system in Croatia. 
Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci/Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of 
Economics, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics, 32(2), 213-232 
Profeta P. and Scabrosetti, S. (2017). The political economy of taxation in Europe. 
Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, 220, 139. 
Raczkowski K. (2015). Measuring the tax gap in the European economy. Journal 
of Economics and Management 21, 58-72 
Raonic I. & Vasic Z. (2014). Пореска утаја пдв у србији и феномен 
фантомских фирми (vat fraud in Serbia and phenomenon of shell (phantom) 
companies). Ekonomika 60(2), 95-106 
Ravn M. O. and Uhlig H. (2002). On adjusting the hodrick-prescott filter for the 
frequency of observations. The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, 
84(2), 371-375. 
Reckon (2009). Study to quantify and analyse the vat gap in the EU-25 member 
states. Taxation Studies 0029, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, 
European Commission 
Riahi-Belkaoui A. (2004). Relationship between tax compliance internationally 
and selected determinants of tax morale. Journal of international accounting, auditing 
and taxation, 13(2), 135-143. 
Riahi-Belkaoui, A. (2004). Relationship between tax compliance internationally 
and selected determinants of tax morale. Journal of international accounting, auditing 
and taxation, 13(2), 135-143. 
Richardson G. (2006). Determinants of tax evasion: A cross-country 
investigation. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 15(2), 
150-169. 
Ristovska M., Mojsoska-Blaževski N. & Nikolov M. (2013). An alternative view 
to the tax evasion: the effect of tax morale on paying taxes in Macedonia and EU 
countries. Serbian Journal of Management 8(2), 169-183 
Roaf J., Atoyan R., Joshi B. and Krogulski K. (2014). 25 years of transition: post-
communist Europe and the IMF. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Rukelj D. (2009). Modelling fiscal and monetary policy interactions in Croatia 
using structural vector error correction model. The Institute of Economics, Zagreb, 
Economic Trends and Economic Policy, 121/2009, 27-58. 
84 
Russo F. F. (2013). Tax morale and tax evasion reports. Economics Letters, 
Elsevier 121(1), 110-114 
Rаоnić I., Vаsić Z. & Pejović I. (2016). Cross check of the tax base in Serbia – 
informative tax return sample. Journal of Central Banking theory and Practice, 
Central bank of Montenegro, 5(2), 119-131 
Schmölders G. (1959). Fiscal psychology: a new branch of public finance. 
National Tax Journal 12(4). 340-345  
Schneider F. (2000). Illegal activities, but still value added ones (?). Size, causes, 
and measurement of the shadow economies all over the world: CESifo Working 
Paper Series 305, CESifo Group Munich 
Schneider F. (2015). Tax losses due to shadow economy activities in OECD 
countries from 2011 to 2013. A preliminary calculation: CESifo Working Paper 
Series 5649, CESifo Group Munich 
Setnikar Cankar S. & Petkovšek V. (2014). Fiscal instability in Slovenia during 
the economic crisis. Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business 17(1), 
195-105 
Simon P., Sacchi, A. and Lago-Peñas, S. (2017). Who Honours the Rules of 
Federalism? Party System Nationalisation and Fiscal Performance, Political Studies. 
Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717714611 
Šimović H. and Deskar-Škrbić M. (2013). Dynamic effects of fiscal policy and 
fiscal multipliers in Croatia. Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u 
Rijeci/Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of Economics, University of Rijeka, Faculty of 
Economics, 31(1), 55-78. 
Šimovic H., Blažić H. & Štambuk A. (2014). Perspectives of tax reforms in 
Croatia. Expert opinion survey. Financial theory and Practice, institute of Public 
Finance, 38(4), 405-439 
Song Y. D. & Yarbrough T. E. (1978). Tax ethics and taxpayer attitudes: A 
survey. Public administration review, 442-452. 
Spengel C., Schmidt F., Heckemeyer J.H. & Nicolay K. (2016). Effective tax 
levels using the Devereux/Griffith methodology. Final report 2016: Project for the 
EU Commission TAXUD/2013/CC/120 Final Report 2016, Mannheim 
Staehr K. (2008). Fiscal policies and business cycles in an enlarged euro area. 
Economic Systems 32(1), 46-69. 
Stern P. C., Dietz T. & Kalof L. (1993). Value orientations, gender, and 
environmental concern. Environment and behavior, 25(5), 322-348. 
References 
     85 
Strielkowski W. & Čábelková I. (2015). Religion, culture, and tax evasion: 
Evidence from the Czech Republic. Religions 6, 657-669 
Tesche J. (2001). Tax harmonization or competition? Croatia and neighboring 
countries: ERSA conference papers ersa01p231, European Regional Science 
Association 
Torgler B.  (2003). Tax morale and institutions. CREMA Working Paper Series 
2003-09, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). 
Torgler B. & Schneider F. (2009). The impact of tax morale and institutional 
quality on the shadow economy. Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier 30(2), 
228-245  
Torgler B. & Valev N. T. (2010). Gender and public attitudes toward corruption 
and tax evasion. Contemporary Economic Policy, 28(4), 554-568. 
Torgler B. (2003a). Tax morale, rule-governed behaviour and trust. Constitutional 
Political Economy, Springer 14(2), 119-140 
Torgler B. (2003b). Tax morale in transition countries. Post-Communist 
Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals 15(3), 357-381 
Torgler B. (2004). A knight without a sword or a toothless tiger? The effects of 
audit courts on tax morale in Switzerland. CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-06, 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) 
Torgler B. (2004a). Tax morale, trust and corruption: Empirical evidence from 
transition countries. CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-05, Center for Research in 
Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) 
Torgler B. (2005). Tax morale and direct democracy. European Journal of 
Political Economy, Elsevier 21(2), 525-531 
Torgler B. (2006). The importance of faith: tax morale and religiosity. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, 61(1), 81-109 
Torgler B. (2007). The impact of direct democracy and local autonomy on tax 
morale in Switzerland. Working Papers 06-2007, Institute of Local Public Finance 
Torgler B. (2012). Tax morale, Eastern Europe and European enlargement. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 45(1-2), 11-25 
Torgler B., Demir C.I., Macintyre A. & Schaffner M. (2008). Causes and 
consequences of tax morale: An empirical investigation. Economic Analysis and 
Policy 38(2), 313-339. 
Torgler B., Schaffner M. & Macintyre A. (2007). Tax Compliance, Tax Morale, 
and Governance Quality. International Center for Public Policy Working Paper 
86 
Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0727, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew 
Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University 
Tujula, M. and Wolswijk, G. (2007). Budget balances in OECD countries: What 
makes them change?. Empirica, 34 (1), 1-14. 
Urban I. (2008). Income redistribution in Croatia. The role of individual taxes and 
social transfers. Financial theory and Practice, institute of Public Finance, 32(3), 
387-403 
Vegh C.A. and Vuletin G. (2015). How is tax policy conducted over the business 
cycle?. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic 
Association. 7(3), 327-70. 
Viren M. (2014). How different are the fiscal policy effects? Assessing the 
importance of cyclical situation, policy coordination, composition of policy 
measures and country-specific features. Revue de l'OFCE 1/2014, 132, 135-157. 
Vogel J. (1974). Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: an interpretation of 
recent survey data. National Tax Journal 27(4), 499-513 
Williams C. C. & Krasniqi B. (2017). Evaluating the individual-and country-level 
variations in tax morale: evidence from 35 Eurasian countries. Journal of Economic 
Studies 44(5), 816-832. 
Williams C.C, Dzhekova R., Franić J & Mishkov L. (2015). Evaluating the policy 
approach towards the undeclared economy in FYR Macedonia. International journal 
of entrepreneurship and small business, 24(2) 
Williams C.C. & Franić J. (2015). Tackling the propensity towards undeclared 
work. Some policy lessons from Croatia. South East European Journal of Economics 
and Business 10(1), 18–31 
Williams C.C. & Franić J. (2016). Explaining participation in the informal 
economy in post-socialist societies. A study of the asymmetry between formal and 
informal institutions in Croatia: Journal Of Contemporary Central And Eastern 
Europe 24(1) 
Woon Nam C., Parsche R. & Schaden B. (2001) . Measurement of value added 
tax evasion in selected EU countries on the basis of national accounts data. CESifo 
Working Paper Series 431, CESifo Group Munich 
Xin Li S. (2010). Social Identities, Ethnic Diversity, and Tax Morale. Public 
Finance Review 38(2), March, 146-177 
Yakovlev A A. (1999). Black cash tax evasion in Russia. Its forms, incentives and 
consequences at firm level: BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 3/1999 
References 
     87 
Yuldashev O. & Khakimov O. (2011). Income taxation and labor force 
participation in transition economies. Evidence from Bulgaria, Russian federation 
and Serbia: Anadolu University Journal of Social Sciences, Anadolu University, 
11(3), 177-198 
 
  
88 
  
Appendices 
     89 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Table A.1. Data on the decomposition of tax revenues in European and 
former Yugoslavian countries used in cluster analysis (as % GDP) 
  
90 
Country 
Averages 
for period 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Value 
added 
taxes Excises 
Custo
ms 
Othe
r 
taxes  
Social 
contribu
tions 
Total tax 
revenue
s 
Croatia 2001-2007 3.1 2.1 12.0 4.2 0.7 0.9 11.7 34.7 
Macedonia 2001-2007 2.5 1.3 8.6 3.7 1.7 0.5 9.1 27.4 
Montenegro 2001-2007 3.3 1.0 13.7 3.4 2.6 0.8 11.7 36.5 
Serbia 2001-2007 5.4 0.9 11.5 4.2 2.3 1.4 12.8 38.5 
Slovenia 2001-2007 5.6 2.2 8.3 3.3 0.3 3.8 14.1 37.6 
Belgium 2001-2007 12.4 3.1 6.8 2 0.3 4.9 15.6 45.1 
Bulgaria 2001-2007 3 2.8 9.1 3.8 1.3 1.1 9.1 30.2 
Czech Republic 2001-2007 4.2 4.2 6.1 2.4 1.1 1 14.8 33.8 
Denmark 2001-2007 24.5 3.1 9.5 3.8 0 5 1.7 47.6 
Germany 2001-2007 8.3 2.1 6.3 2.2 0.6 1.9 17.4 38.8 
Estonia 2001-2007 6.1 1.4 8.4 0 3.4 1 10.5 30.8 
Ireland 2001-2007 8.9 3.5 7 1.1 1.5 3.6 5.1 30.7 
Greece 2001-2007 4.2 2.9 6.8 2.6 0 4.4 12.2 33.1 
Spain 2001-2007 6.8 3.6 6 2.3 0 3.6 12.7 35 
France 2001-2007 7.8 2.6 7 2.2 0 7 17.5 44.1 
Italy 2001-2007 10.4 2.6 5.8 2.3 0 6.8 12.1 40 
Cyprus 2001-2007 3.7 4.9 7.5 2.7 1.4 3.6 6.8 30.6 
Latvia 2001-2007 5.6 1.9 7.1 3.1 0.2 1.7 8.6 28.2 
Lithuania 2001-2007 6.8 1.7 7.2 2.9 0.3 1.1 9.4 29.4 
Luxembourg 2001-2007 6.9 6.3 5.9 0.2 4.1 3.6 11.3 38.3 
Hungary 2001-2007 6.9 2.3 8 3.2 0.5 4 12.7 37.6 
Malta 2001-2007 6.1 4 6.8 2.8 0.5 4.2 7.4 31.8 
Netherlands 2001-2007 6.2 3.3 6.9 1.2 1.2 3.8 13.5 36.1 
Austria 2001-2007 10.1 2.4 7.7 2.6 0 5 15.1 42.9 
Poland 2001-2007 4.4 2.1 7.5 3.7 0.6 2.2 13.5 34 
Portugal 2001-2007 5.1 3 7.8 2.7 0.3 3.8 11.3 34 
Romania 2001-2007 2.8 2.8 7.3 3 0.7 1.5 10.4 28.5 
Slovakia 2001-2007 3.1 2.7 7.2 2.6 0.7 2.1 13 31.4 
Finland 2001-2007 13 3.6 8.1 3.7 0 2.4 11.6 42.4 
Sweden 2001-2007 16.7 2.8 8.4 2.9 0 11.6 4.1 46.5 
United Kingdom 2001-2007 10.1 3.1 6.3 3.4 0 5.1 7.6 35.6 
Iceland 2001-2007 13.9 1.5 10 2.3 0.3 6.2 3 37.2 
Norway 2001-2007 9.8 9.8 8 2.4 0.1 3.1 9.1 42.3 
Switzerland 2001-2007 8.6 2.5 3.5 0.4 1.3 3.9 6.6 26.8 
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Croatia 2008-2014 3.0 2.3 11.8 3.5 0.4 1.2 11.8 34 
Macedonia 2008-2014 2.1 1.1 8.5 3.4 1.0 0.7 8.8 25.6 
Montenegro 2008-2014 3.0 1.5 12.7 4.5 1.3 0.3 11.5 34.8 
Serbia 2008-2014 4.4 1.4 10.3 4.9 1.3 1.3 12.6 36.2 
Slovenia 2008-2014 5.5 1.7 8.2 4.1 0.0 2.7 14.8 37 
Belgium 2008-2014 12.3 2.9 6.9 1.8 0.3 5.3 16.4 45.9 
Bulgaria 2008-2014 2.9 2.1 9 5 0 1.1 7.2 27.3 
Czech Republic 2008-2014 3.6 3.4 7 2.6 1.3 0.8 14.7 33.4 
Denmark 2008-2014 25.8 2.4 9.6 3.3 0 4.8 1.3 47.2 
Germany 2008-2014 8.6 2.3 7 1.8 0.6 2.1 16.5 38.9 
Estonia 2008-2014 5.5 1.5 8.3 0 4.2 1 11.9 32.4 
Ireland 2008-2014 9.2 2.4 6.1 0.6 1.8 3.3 5.8 29.2 
Greece 2008-2014 5.2 1.9 7 3.3 0.1 5.3 13.2 36 
Spain 2008-2014 7.4 2.1 5.3 2.1 0 2.9 12.7 32.5 
France 2008-2014 8.2 2.6 6.8 2.2 0 7.3 18.4 45.5 
Italy 2008-2014 11.5 2.4 5.9 2.5 0 6.8 13.3 42.4 
Cyprus 2008-2014 3.4 6.1 8.4 3 0.3 3.4 7.9 32.5 
Latvia 2008-2014 5.8 1.7 6.8 3.3 0 1.8 8.9 28.3 
Lithuania 2008-2014 4.1 1.5 7.6 2.9 0.1 0.7 11.5 28.4 
Luxembourg 2008-2014 8.4 5.2 6.9 0.2 3.3 3.1 12.2 39.3 
Hungary 2008-2014 5.9 1.6 8.7 3.3 0 5.7 13 38.2 
Malta 2008-2014 6.4 5.9 7.5 2.9 0 3.7 7 33.4 
Netherlands 2008-2014 7.2 2.4 6.6 1.1 1.1 3.6 14.5 36.5 
Austria 2008-2014 10 2.1 7.7 2.3 0 5.3 15 42.4 
Poland 2008-2014 4.6 2.1 7.4 3.7 0.3 2.2 12.5 32.8 
Portugal 2008-2014 6.2 3 7.9 2.1 0.5 3.6 11.8 35.1 
Romania 2008-2014 3.4 2.2 7.8 3 0.3 1.6 9.2 27.5 
Slovakia 2008-2014 2.9 2.7 6.5 2.7 0 1.7 12.6 29.1 
Finland 2008-2014 12.6 2.4 8.7 3.5 0 2.6 12.4 42.2 
Sweden 2008-2014 14.9 2.9 9 2.5 0 10.9 3.7 43.9 
United Kingdom 2008-2014 9.7 2.8 6.4 3.2 0 5.3 7.9 35.3 
Iceland 2008-2014 13.3 2 8 1.9 0.4 6 3.5 35.1 
Norway 2008-2014 9.7 9.6 7.6 2 0.1 2.6 9.4 41 
Switzerland 2008-2014 8.6 2.8 3.5 0.4 1.1 4 6.6 27 
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Appendix 2 
Table A.2. Former Yugoslavian countries in international databases and 
indexes 
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Notes: 
1) = World Bank Doing Business surveys: Paying Taxes 
2) = World Bank Enterprise Survey: Corruption; Informality; Regulations and Taxes 
3) = Transparency international: Corruption perception index 
4) = Heritage foundation: Index of Economic Freedom 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Appendix 3 
Table A.3 Shadow economy in former Yugoslavian countries, %GDP 
 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia 
2001 38.06% 30.34% 41.52% 40.18% 35.59% 25.96% 
2002 36.87% 27.09% 41.19% 40.34% 39.17% 27.70% 
2003 36.69% 23.01% 39.25% 39.93% 41.52% 28.00% 
2004 36.99% 25.92% 39.33% 37.57% 39.07% 27.03% 
2005 38.82% 25.91% 31.84% 39.72% 36.53% 26.90% 
2006 34.96% 24.26% 29.32% 38.20% 32.19% 25.86% 
2007 34.71% 25.48% 30.06% 31.00% 28.51% 25.16% 
2008 32.37% 26.06% 32.12% 33.70% 29.44% 26.28% 
2009 36.08% 29.83% 32.75% 32.52% 31.58% 28.14% 
2010 37.13% 30.34% 30.21% 31.82% 37.35% 29.01% 
2011 39.44% 31.66% 32.66% 33.50% 34.74% 29.48% 
2012 38.41% 32.10% 30.73% 31.35% 32.42% 29.97% 
2013 36.45% 31.61% 29.93% 28.75% 27.95% 29.49% 
Source: Author’s extract based on Mai and Schneider (2016) 
94 
Table A.4 Tax burden in former Yugoslavian countries, %GDP 
 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia 
2001      37.04% 
2002  35.86%    37.38% 
2003  34.97%    37.55% 
2004  34.24%    37.60% 
2005 35.59% 33.98% 27.42%  38.22% 38.08% 
2006 38.24% 34.18% 27.04% 35.11% 38.54% 37.75% 
2007 38.27% 34.31% 27.68% 37.86% 38.76% 37.05% 
2008 37.31% 34.62% 27.74% 37.85% 38.32% 36.63% 
2009 36.28% 34.31% 26.50% 34.22% 36.62% 36.56% 
2010 37.30% 33.67% 25.71% 34.01% 36.24% 37.25% 
2011 38.42% 32.72% 25.56% 32.70% 34.95% 36.81% 
2012 38.50% 33.88% 25.15% 33.33% 36.06% 37.30% 
2013 37.53% 33.87% 24.11% 34.69% 35.25% 37.19% 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data offered by the IMF and corresponding 
Ministries of Finance 
Appendix 4 
Table A.5 Testing the presence of a time trend in individual series 
Country Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovenia 
intercept 
-1.77 -2.48 1.61 5.29 2.93 -0.97 
(-1.32) (-3.8)*** (2.23)* (5.25)*** (1.62) (-2.18)* 
trend 
0.0009 0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0026 -0.0014 0.0005 
(1.38) (3.89)*** (-2.16)* (-5.19)*** (-1.58) (2.32)** 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. t-statistics computed using OLS residuals in parenthesis. Estimates are 
performed using Eviews 9.5. 
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Appendix 5 
Table A.6 Fines for serious tax offences оf a legal person according to tax laws 
  Personal Income Tax Corporate Income Tax Value Added Tax 
BiH 
FBiH 
 1023 to 10226 € (5-50 
MW)  
 1534 to 51129 € (7.5 to 
247 MW)  
 50% of the non-
calculated or unpaid 
amount with a 
minimum of 51 €  
RS 
 10% of each monthly 
due tax, up to 150%  
 10225.84 to 30677.51 € 
(50-203 MW)  
BD 
10% of each monthly 
due tax, up to 150%  
10% of each monthly due 
tax, up to 150%  
CRO 
677 to 6767 € (1.5-15 
MW) 
271 to 27066 € (0.6 to 62 
MW) 
271 to 1847 €  (0.6 to 
4 MW) 
MKD 
3000 € (13 MW) 3000 € (13 MW) 2000 to 2500 € (9-11 
MW) 
MNE 
2000 to 20000 € (7-70 
MW) 
550  to 16500 €  (2-57 
MW) 
6000 to 20000 € (21-
69 MW)  
SRB 
819 to 8189 € (3-33 
MW) 
819 to 4914 € (3-20 MW) 819 to 8189 € (3-33 
MW) 
SLO 
400 to 5000 € (0.5-6 
MW) 
3200 to 30000 € (4-37 
MW) 
2000 to 125000 € 
(2.5-155 MW) 
Notes: Local currency units recalculated to euros using middle exchange rate 
of corresponding Central banks on June 19th 2017. Euros recalculated to approx. 
minimum wage (MW) values using Eurostat data for 2017S1. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Appendix 6 
Table A.7 Estimates of equation [6] including a country dummy for Slovenia 
 Tax burden 
contextuals 
Tax burden 
contextuals 
Tax burden 
contextuals 
Shadow 
activity 
contextuals 
Economic 
freedom 
H3-H5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
age 0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
0.01 
(0)*** 
gender -0.17 
(0.07)** 
-0.17 
(0.07)** 
-0.18 
(0.07)** 
-0.15 
(0.07)** 
-0.18 
(0.07)** 
-0.21 
(0.07)*** 
living -0.04 
(0.23) 
-0.03 
(0.23) 
-0.03 
(0.23) 
-0.01 
(0.23) 
-0.04 
(0.23) 
0 
(0.23) 
divorced -0.16 
(0.16) 
-0.16 
(0.16) 
-0.12 
(0.16) 
-0.18 
(0.16) 
-0.17 
(0.16) 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
separated 0.7 
(0.67) 
0.7 
(0.67) 
0.74 
(0.68) 
0.67 
(0.68) 
0.7 
(0.67) 
0.75 
(0.7) 
widowed -0.14 
(0.13) 
-0.14 
(0.13) 
-0.11 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
single -0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
education 0.11 
(0.04)** 
0.12 
(0.04)*** 
0.09 
(0.04)** 
0.13 
(0.04)*** 
0.09 
(0.04)** 
0.05 
(0.04) 
religion 0.06 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04)* 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04)* 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
income -0.14 
(0.02)*** 
-0.14 
(0.02)*** 
-0.1 
(0.02)*** 
-0.14 
(0.02)*** 
-0.11 
(0.02)*** 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
parttime -0.39 
(0.2)* 
-0.4 
(0.2)** 
-0.37 
(0.2)* 
-0.41 
(0.2)** 
-0.36 
(0.2)* 
-0.34 
(0.2)* 
selfem -0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.15 
(0.15) 
-0.14 
(0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
-0.22 
(0.15) 
retired 0.05 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.09 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.07 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
athome 0.1 
(0.17) 
0.08 
(0.17) 
0.07 
(0.17) 
0.07 
(0.17) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
student -0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.18 
(0.13) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.15 
(0.13) 
-0.15 
(0.13) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
unemp -0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.14 
(0.09) 
otheremp -0.08 
(0.28) 
-0.09 
(0.28) 
-0.05 
(0.28) 
-0.05 
(0.28) 
-0.07 
(0.28) 
-0.02 
(0.28) 
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Table A.7 Estimates of equation [6] including a country dummy for Slovenia, Part 
2/2 
 Tax burden 
contextuals 
Tax burden 
contextuals 
Tax burden 
contextuals 
Shadow 
activity 
contextuals 
Economic 
freedom 
H3-H5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
conpol 0.08 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
0.11 
(0.06)* 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
conjus -0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.05)* 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.1 
(0.05)** 
conparl 0.09 
(0.05)* 
0.09 
(0.05)* 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.1 
(0.05)* 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
congov 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.1 
(0.05)* 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
discpol 0.03 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0 
(0.05) 
pride 0.21 
(0.04)*** 
0.21 
(0.04)*** 
0.26 
(0.04)*** 
0.25 
(0.04)*** 
0.2 
(0.04)*** 
0.29 
(0.04)*** 
bribe 0.58 
(0.02)*** 
0.58 
(0.02)*** 
0.58 
(0.02)*** 
0.57 
(0.02)*** 
0.57 
(0.02)*** 
0.58 
(0.02)*** 
slovenia -0.3 
(0.12)** 
-0.42 
(0.13)*** 
0.37 
(0.15)** 
-0.33 
(0.12)** 
-0.72 
(0.14)*** 
-1.57 
(0.17)*** 
taxb -3.33 
(0.94)*** 
-3.53 
(0.94)***    
3.11 
(1.24)** 
change_ 
taxb  
-2.8 
(1)**     
dtaxb 
  
-13.22 
(1.69)***    
rest 
  
2.89 
(1.31)**    
shadow 
   
-0.59 
(0.15)***  
-2.19 
(0.2)*** 
ecfr  
  
 0.08 
(0.01)*** 
0.25 
(0.02)*** 
/cut1 1.35 
(0.48)*** 
1.34 
(0.48)*** 
0.94 
(0.48)*** 
2.62 
(0.33)*** 
6.75 
(0.83)*** 
17.62 
(1.64)*** 
/cut2 4.69 
(0.48)*** 
4.68 
(0.48)*** 
4.28 
(0.49)*** 
5.96 
(0.34)*** 
10.09 
(0.84)*** 
20.99 
(1.65)*** 
No. of obs 6,148 6,148 6,148 6,148 6,148 6,148 
Pseudo R2 0.1518 0.1527 0.1578 0.1522 0.1539 0.1686 
 
 
